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OVERVIEW
Part I o f this thesis comprises a review paper which will contextualise the empirical 
paper that forms Part II of the thesis. Section A of the literature review offers the 
reader an introduction to the often-misunderstood phenomenon of malingering. 
Although avoided by psychologists perhaps due to its seeming incompatibility with 
the establishment of a therapeutic alliance (Rogers, 1997), the case for the importance 
o f research into improving malingering detection methods is presented. The reader is 
then orientated to the contemporary understanding of malingering as an elected means 
o f adaptation to circumstance, and this adaptational perspective is used to elaborate on 
what and how individuals might malinger. Whilst thinking about malingering might 
be interesting of itself, the aim of any malingering research must be to improve upon 
the accuracy o f classification and detection methods. Section B o f the review paper 
provides the reader with a summary o f the development of methodologies and 
strategies used in the clinical assessment o f malingering. This is presented with 
reference to the theoretical account o f the malingering construct elucidated in Section 
A. Detection methods used in malingered mental illness and malingered cognitive 
impairment are presented independently, and the distinct domains in which these 
assessments tend to focus is emphasised. Specifically, individuals suspected o f 
malingering mental illness are assessed predominantly in the psychiatric (not 
cognitive) domain, and although corroborative evidence of malingering on cognitive 
tests is routinely sought in order to augment classification accuracy, no cognitive tests 
have been developed specifically to assess malingered mental illness. This constitutes 
a gap in the research literature since feigning on tests of cognition among persons 
malingering mental illness has been repeatedly evidenced (e.g. Boone et al., 2002).
Advances in the literature on malingered cognitive impairment (in the context of 
traumatic brain-injury) are presented and considered then, in the context of 
developing bespoke cognitive instruments for the assessment of malingered cognitive 
symptoms in the context of mental illness.
Part II o f this thesis constitutes the empirical study that was designed and executed in 
the aim o f investigating the utility and validity of a test battery designed to assess 
malingered cognitive symptoms in severe mental illness. A three-group “fully 
controlled” simulation study is described, in which psychiatric inpatients, simulating 
malingerers and healthy controls (total n = 105), were administered a multi-method 
malingered cognitive symptoms test battery, comprising interview- and performance- 
based tasks. Established malingering tests were also administered in order that 
simulated malingering could be externally validated, and also so that classification 
according to the cognitive battery, could be compared with that according to ‘gold 
standard’ instruments. Tests of true ability and pathology were administered in order 
to explore the potential confound o f true mental illness with malingering measures, 
and also so that the true symptom status of simulating malingerers could be 
quantified. Results demonstrate a high degree of precision of discrimination between 
simulating malingerers and their genuine counterparts on the basis of composite 
scores on the cognitive symptoms battery. Results also show that composite scores on 
the cognitive symptoms battery are not correlated with true pathology in genuine 
patients, estimated IQ and level of educational attainment.
Part in of this thesis constitutes the critical review section in which qualitative 
information pertaining to the execution processes of the study is discussed. This
information pertains mainly to the engagement of acutely mentally ill patients in this 
research, and also includes personal reflections on conducting a study entailing 
simulation.
PART I: REVIEW PAPER
SECTION A: THE MALINGERING CONSTRUCT
WHAT IS MALINGERING?
The DSM-IV definition
In DSM-IV, malingering is defined as “the intentional production of false, or grossly 
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives 
such as avoiding military duty or work, obtaining financial compensation, evading 
criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
Although malingering can occur in the context of genuine mental illness, it is not 
considered to be a form of psychopathology or mental illness in its own right. In 
contrast with genuine psychiatric illnesses, malingering refers to a voluntary 
behavioural manipulation in which symptoms that are not experienced are reported 
and portrayed. Malingering is not listed as a diagnosis in DSM-IV, but rather is 
appended, and assigned a ‘V’ code to mark it as a condition that requires further 
attention and elucidation. Despite frequent reference in the literature to ‘diagnosing 
malingering’, strictly speaking malingering is detected, not ‘diagnosed’.
Further to the above definition of malingering, DSM-IV provides guidelines for 
contexts in which the presence of malingering should be suspected. It suggests that 
the veracity of reported symptoms, and the intended goal of behaviour, warrants 
further investigation if: (1) the context is a medico-legal one; (2) there is a marked 
discrepancy between claimed symptoms and objective findings; (3) the individual is 
uncooperative in either evaluation or treatment protocols or (4) there is a concomitant 
presence of Anti-social Personality Disorder (ASPD). The usefulness and limitations 
of these guidelines will be discussed later.
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Differential Diagnoses -  Non-malingered symptom production
In DSM-IV, malingering is differentiated from factitious disorder, somatoform and 
conversion disorders, and also from hypochondriasis. The latter are psychiatric 
diagnoses where patients either produce actual symptoms, or genuinely believe in the 
existence of reported symptoms. In the case of factitious disorder for example, 
patients report symptoms in the (psychological) interest of assuming the sick-role, and 
not in order to gain financially or by other external means. When symptoms are 
malingered however, they are consciously fabricated with the intention of achieving 
specific goals, and these goals are not psychological or ‘secondary’ in nature.
The empirical validity of the distinction between factitious disorders and malingering 
has been questioned. Rogers and Neumann (2003) broadly discuss difficulties in 
measuring the patient’s intentionality, which distinguishes malingering from these 
differential diagnoses. More specifically, they discuss how the psychological gain 
achieved by patients seeking to adopt the ‘sick role’ through symptom production in 
factitious disorder or hypochondriasis, cannot be empirically isolated from the 
external gains that are potentiated by the adoption of this role. Since persons with 
factitious disorder (a DSM diagnosis) might externally gain through financial benefits 
for incapacity, help from others and dismissal from responsibility, establishing that 
they do not seek these external gains as well as the intrapsychic ones that define their 
illness is theoretically problematic. It seems possible that the invisibility of patients 
intentions, might lead to under-diagnosis of malingering in such contexts. This might 
be particularly true since the ‘setting conditions’ according to DSM-IV, of concurrent 
lack of treatment and assessment co-operation and comorbid ASPD are more likely to 
be absent than present in patients apparently presenting with factitious, somatoform 
and hypochondriac disorders. Furthermore, there is little research on whether these
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disorders can co-exist with malingering (Rogers, 1997). The fact that evidence of 
malingering does not preclude the presence of genuine (unspecified) psychopathology 
suggests that this coincidence is theoretically possible, augmenting the difficulties in 
malingering classification.
THE MERE SUGGESTION OF MALINGERING
Avoiding or denying the issue
Clinicians and the public alike regard malingering, like all forms of deception, 
pejoratively. According to Rogers and Cavanaugh (1983) malingering is 
automatically equated with the negative traits of “deviousness and manipulativeness”. 
Labelling someone as a malingerer has far-reaching medico-legal, economic and 
personal ramifications for both the accuser and the accused. Consequently, this 
stigmatising topic which sits awkwardly in our social context, has until recently been 
poorly researched and couched under a variety of military and medical euphemisms 
(Rogers, 1997). Sensitivity to issues surrounding malingering and illness deception in 
both modem medicine and social security policy in most Western democracies, has 
also contributed to the paucity of research in this area (Halligan, Bass & Oakley, 
2003).
According to Rogers and Neumann (2003) three fundamental misconceptions within 
the biomedical model about the nature of illness deception prohibit advancements in 
our understanding of malingering, and hence in our ability to detect it. These 
“untruths” are listed as: (1) that all illness behaviours have a medical cause; (2) that 
all patients in describing their impairments and disabilities do so accurately and (3) 
that illness deception is not common.
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Misplaced compassion, plus an inability to distinguish between real and feigned 
symptoms, can lead to reticence on the part of practitioners in questioning the veracity 
of reported complaints (Rogers, 1997). Clinicians may routinely seek to minimise or 
avoid raising doubt regarding the genuineness of illness complaints, since this would 
compromise the therapeutic relationship, flouting the ground rules laid down in 
training about the primary role of the clinician in the care of the patient (Halligan, 
Bass & Oakley, 2003). However, in neglecting non-medical or non-psychiatric 
explanations for illness behaviours, modem medicine and psychiatry risk 
underestimating the capacity of individuals to control their actions, as they 
successfully do in many other areas of their lives. There is no logical basis for why 
illness deception should be any less common than other forms of deceptive behaviour 
(e.g. lying or fraud) that are commonly present in non-medical contexts (Halligan, 
Bass & Oakley, 2003). Also the routine assessment of malingering in certain (e.g. 
forensic psychiatric) settings is advisable since, in the act of diagnosis where 
hypotheses must be ruled in or out based on available evidence, neglecting to assess 
for malingering, means that it cannot logically be ruled out (Rogers & Bender, 2003).
The ‘patient-doctor relationship* involves a spectrum of psychosocial factors that 
contribute to symptom presentation, and within the biopsychosocial tradition, more 
contextual paradigms for the conceptualisation of malingering are required (Halligan, 
Bass & Oakley, 2003). Malingering is best described and understood within a social 
legal framework that considers social responsibility and freewill as paramount, and 
this is the central premise for the Adaptational Model of Malingering (Rogers, 1990a) 
which will be described later.
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The role of the clinician in investigating malingering
According to some writers (e.g. Sharpe, 2003), in assessing malingering, clinicians 
should confine themselves to a judgement about the extent to which they are 
convinced that the patient in question is suffering from a relevant psychiatric disorder. 
They should not be in the business of ‘diagnosing* malingering, and should hold in 
mind the probabilistic nature of their opinion, presenting this with objective indicators 
and statistics where possible. Clinicians must be aware of the potential biases that 
may influence their judgements, including whether they ‘like’ a patient and their own 
trusting, sympathetic or indeed sceptical predisposition (Sharpe, 2003). In their 
capacity as medical experts, clinicians are invited by lawyers to comment upon the 
likely veracity of a claimant’s symptoms, in contrast to being asked their opinion on 
the claimants’ honesty.
Malingered psychopathology -  Reliance on subjective report
Uncomfortable pejorative overtones seem inescapable and permeate the very defining 
language of malingering. Consequently, the majority of clinicians shy away from 
routine investigations of malingering, and fail to question the objective veracity of 
their patients’ reports, it would appear in some cases, as a matter of principle 
(Halligan, Bass & Oakley, 2003). Malingering is rarely considered or evidenced 
where observable and measurable physical pathology can explain reported symptoms. 
Psychiatric illnesses however, offer a particular challenge with respect to malingering, 
since few psychiatric diagnoses have an associated or observable pathology, and their 
diagnoses are made on the basis of subjective report. This not only means that 
genuine psychiatric patients may be open to the accusation of malingering, but also 
that persons inclined to malinger may tactically do so in this domain. They may 
believe themselves less likely to be detected since a CT or MRI scan, or a blood or
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urine test cannot unequivocally prove or disprove their purported complaints 
(Halligan, Bass & Oakley, 2003).
Theoretically, in the psychiatric domain malingering is distinguished from psychiatric 
illness by the absence of psychopathology, and the identification of potential external 
incentives and an intent to deceive in order to obtain these gains. For symptoms to 
indicate a psychiatric illness, they must not only be severe and persistent, but they 
must also match a recognised pattern, according to established diagnostic criteria (e.g. 
DSM-IV, APA 1994). These criteria define relatively homogenous groups of patients 
for the purposes of clinical practice and research, yet specific diagnoses do not 
actually have precise boundaries. To complicate matters, it is recognised that even if 
a patient’s symptoms do not clearly fit a particular diagnostic criteria, that they may 
have an ‘atypical’ form of a condition. These diagnostic limitations indicate that 
‘degree of fit’ with defined categories, is a useful but imperfect way of distinguishing 
between genuine and feigned psychiatric illnesses (Halligan, Bass & Oakley, 2003).
Psychiatric illness is validated and diagnosed when the presence of psychopathology 
is determined. But this determination is necessarily an inference since 
psychopathology, unlike physical pathology, is a hypothetical concept. If our 
inferences are based on subjective reports, how do we systematically distinguish 
between genuine and feigned presentations of psychiatric illness? The core of this 
judgment is based on the concept of consistency, since clinicians expect genuine 
psychiatric illness to be consistent in a variety of ways. These include consistency 
within the patient’s history, between reported symptoms and both observed behaviour 
and published diagnostic criteria, and also across sources of information (Rogers, 
1988a).
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Do clinicians ‘know’ malingering when they see it?
Whilst the greatest asset of clinical interviewing is its versatility and adaptability to 
diverse patient populations, clinical decisions and evaluations of malingering based on 
unstructured traditional interviews are unreliable, and according to Rogers (1997) 
base themselves on an “over-reliance on unvalidated hunches”. Furthermore, the non­
standardisation of unstructured clinical interviewing renders it unamenable to 
empirical and scientific enquiry, since its reliability and validity cannot be verified, or 
indeed falsified (Popper, 1959).
Clinicians’ confirmatory bias and attribution error, can and does lead to under or over 
diagnosis of malingering when using a clinical interview alone (Sharpe, 2003). 
Evidence also illustrates that examiners tend to overestimate their ability to make 
correct judgements about presence or absence of malingering in patients with whom 
they have established a rapport (Halligan, Bass & Oakley, 2003). Such social factors 
reinforce the inadequacy not only of our awareness and therefore investigation of 
malingering in clinical settings, but also of our investment in malingering research 
(Rogers, 1997).
According to Rogers and Bender (2003) the presupposition that malingering can be 
intuited, means not only that decisions are unlikely to be critically reviewed, but also 
that no additional data is likely to be sought to confirm or disconfirm such 
“unvalidated hunches” (Rogers, 1997). The classic research by Rosenhan (1973) 
evidences the potential woeful inaccuracy of such intuitive judgements, where 
individuals feigning hallucinations evaded suspicion or detection, and instead were 
hospitalised. Furthermore, as shall be discussed in the later critique of the 
criminological perspective of malingering, strong adherents to the conceptualisation
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of malingering provided in DSM-IV, are likely to over-emphasise malingering in 
‘bad’ persons and under-emphasise it in ‘good’ persons. Misclassifications on this 
basis could result in genuine patients in forensic psychiatric settings being punished 
and not treated on the basis that they are thought to be malingering. On the other 
hand, malingerers whose pleasant and compliant dispositions assist them in evading 
detection, might receive inappropriate medication or therapy, or be exculpated from 
offences on the basis of (feigned) mental illness.
If Rogers’ (1997) hypothesis that clinicians do not possess an adequate threshold 
model in conducting their unstructured interviews for when malingering should be 
suspected, an augmentation in malingering knowledge and an orientation towards 
screening tools or strategies ought be operationalised. According to Rogers, where 
the setting conditions for malingering are present, given the enormity of the costs of 
false positive or negative classification, standardised, context-relevant malingering 
investigations should be conducted as a matter of routine.
MALINGERING -  EXISTENCE, PREVALENCE AND COST 
Malingering is a reality, albeit an uncomfortable one
There is an implicit recognition and acceptance that an individual’s choice to feign or 
exaggerate illness, is a legitimate explanation for some illness behaviours associated 
with personal or financial incentives (Halligan, Bass, & Oakley, 2003). More 
generous benefits have become more widely available over the last 30 years, and it 
seems unlikely that medical factors alone can adequately explain the large uptake in 
work-related incapacity benefits since the 1970s despite improvements on most 
objective measures of health (Halligan, Bass & Oakley, 2003). Significantly, most of 
the conditions associated with this increase are symptom-based illnesses, which
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ultimately rely on the credibility of the complainant’s report. It also seems likely that 
the increasing cultural acceptability of the possibility of psychological sequelae of 
stress or injury, affords claims of disability on this basis a new legitimacy that is 
greater now that ever before (Halligan, Bass & Oakley, 2003). It is not surprising 
then, that numbers of reported complainants have increased commensurately, and 
hypothetically then, so have numbers of malingerers in this area. These facts highlight 
the significance of continued investment into the exploration of malingered cognitive 
and psychiatric symptoms.
Rogers (1997) notes that concern about defendants faking mental illness in order to 
avoid criminal responsibility dates back at least to the 10th century. Today it is 
commonly known that a person who is found by psychiatric and legal assessment to 
have committed a grievous offence in involuntary obeisance of pathological 
cognitions and experiences, may be deemed incompetent to stand trial for his offences 
on the basis of mental illness. In this event, a patient (in the UK) would be detained 
under the Mental Health Act (DOH, 1983), issued a Hospital Order and administered 
treatment and rehabilitation in an appropriately secure psychiatric setting. It is not 
difficult to imagine how the possibility of being exculpated from offences, and 
thereby avoiding punishment by prison, might motivate a proportion of offenders to 
malinger mental illness. It might be that malingerers’ misconceptions about the 
comparative idyll of the psychiatric hospital are instrumental in crystallising decisions 
to affect a malingered mental illness, and cases of undetected malingerers admitting 
their sanity following the commencement of hospital treatment for feigned symptoms 
are not unheard of (Broughton & Chesterman, 2001).
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The cost of malingering
The use of the National Health Service, and its resources is severely impacted by 
individuals who malinger. Access to clinicians by patients with valid concerns might 
be obstructed, as well as costs escalated by needless tests and treatments for falsified 
symptoms. Whether the goal is to obtain drugs, to secure financial benefits such as 
disability payment, or to avoid punishment following an offence, the costs to health 
care delivery systems in terms of money, time and energy commitment have been 
shown to be sizeable (Rogers, 1997). In the context of private litigation and insurance 
claims, the assets of insurance companies are at stake in the event of malingering, 
affecting consumers of insurance whose premiums are raised in the event of the 
illegitimate ‘windfalls’ of successful malingering clients.
Quantification of the cost of malingering logically requires knowledge of its 
prevalence. Since malingering prevalence must be estimated, and remains elusive for 
the theoretical and practical reasons outlined below, we cannot definitively name the 
true cost of malingering to our health system and society in general.
The prevalence of malingering
Since most clinicians are not formally trained to actively consider deception in their 
patients, it is reasonable to assume that a large proportion of sophisticated malingerers 
pass undetected. In this way, it is likely that cases of ‘poor’ or blatant malingering, 
that give rise to suspicion and are easily detected, provide for a low estimate of the 
true prevalence of malingering. Also, since the potential prevalence of malingering is 
mediated by unpredictable environmental change (i.e. the commission of an offence), 
it is a non-static variable unlike genuine disorders, and its base-rate prevalence is 
difficult to obtain.
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No generally acknowledged epidemiological data exist on the base rate or prevalence 
of malingering. Myriad estimations however have been posited, both across and 
within various diagnostic groups and settings (Miller, 2001). It is not disputed 
however, that malingering is more prevalent in legal and forensic settings, than in 
general clinical settings, where potential external incentives are less overtly available. 
In 2000, Rogers and Cruise estimated malingering to occur in approximately one sixth 
of all forensic psychiatric cases, stating also that this figure probably underestimated 
the actual prevalence of malingering, since it logically excluded individuals who 
successfully feigned psychopathology.
Estimates of the base-rate of neuropsychological malingering occurrence in litigating 
or ‘benefit seeking’ populations range from approximately 7.5-15% (Trueblood & 
Schmidt, 1993), to 18-33% (Binder, 1993). Mittenberg et al. (2002) in a more recent 
study of 131 practising members of The American Board of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, provided estimates for the prevalence of malingering in a variety of 
different clinical conditions. These included estimates of 39% in the case of mild 
head injury, and 15% for depressive disorders. Whilst the figures quoted here are 
estimates of malingering prevalence, and their ranges are large, they are undeniably 
significant.
WHY DO PEOPLE MALINGER?
Since malingering refers to responses and behaviours that are produced for a 
circumscribed purpose, it is important to answer the question of why people malinger 
in order to usefully consider potential detection methods. In order to elucidate the 
primary motivators of malingering, Rogers (1990a,b) proposed three non-mutually 
exclusive explanatory models. These were the Pathogenic Model, the Criminological
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Model and the Adaptational Model of Malingering, and will be outlined in detail 
below. Most clinicians currently understand malingering from an adaptational 
perspective (Rogers, 1997), with its determinants rooted in the idiosyncratic 
environmental context rather than within the malingering, or deceptive individual. 
Malingering then, is considered to be a behaviour that individuals produce, rather than 
a propensity that they have. This understanding emerged from a research-driven 
process of elimination of the conceptual difficulties underpinning earlier 
conceptualisations of malingering. This adaptational perspective has repeatedly been 
shown to encompass the most prototypical characteristics of malingered presentations 
(Rogers et al., 1994b, 1998) as shall be elaborated later.
The Pathogenic Model of Malingering
Historically malingering has been understood from a pathogenic perspective, at the 
crux of which is the notion that ‘faking’ symptoms is driven by the underlying force 
of a true mental disorder. It was thought that in order to gain control over emerging 
and worsening psychotic symptoms, patients might create symptoms and portray them 
as genuine. Motivation, according to this explanation of malingering, appears to have 
a defence-like quality in the psychodynamic tradition and, in this way, is internal to 
the patient, rather than emblematic of a conscious adjustment to environmental 
variables. Although it is not currently disputed that malingering can coexist with true 
impairment, it is the intrapsychic motivational implications of the pathogenic model 
that have become outdated, with its proposition that symptom fabrication is an 
extension of genuine psychopathology.
The Pathogenic Model of malingering is underpinned by the medicalisation of illness 
deception with its assumption that a person must be ill to ‘want’ to feign the sick role.
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It suggests that the simulation of insanity irrespective of how consciously or 
unconsciously motivated, should be regarded as a manifestation of mental illness. It 
ignores the fundamental notions of responsibility, free will and choice to its detriment.
The Criminological Model of Malingering
Moralistic notions of badness and crime were bound to the very diagnostic 
nomenclature of malingering in DSM-III (APA, 1980), where a criminological model 
of malingering was first articulated. Language such as “high index of suspicion” and 
“strongly suspected”, continues to be associated with the phenomenon of malingering 
( DSM-IV: APA, 1994). According to this model, malingering is most likely to be 
seen in persons with ASPD, who are uncooperative with forensic evaluations and 
treatments, or whose purported symptoms are discrepant with objective findings. On 
the basis of the DSM-IV definition, malingerers form an immoral and criminal group, 
and a causal link between “bad character” and motivation to malinger appears to have 
been spuriously presupposed. Although clinicians’ estimates of the prevalence of 
malingering is significantly higher in forensic psychiatric (15.7%) than non-forensic 
psychiatric (7.4%) settings (Rogers, Sewell & Goldstein, 1994), it appears erroneous 
and simplistic to attribute this increased prevalence to a convergence of ‘badness’ 
(bad person, in bad circumstances, performing badly). To critics of a criminological 
perspective, the association between ASPD and malingering is an illusory correlation 
between the forensic setting of most malingering research, and the high prevalence of 
ASPD in these settings (Rogers, 1997). Yet this model gives ASPD causal and 
essential status in the ‘development’ of malingering, which is misleading since it 
seems likely that not all malingerers fulfil the ASPD criteria (Rogers, 1997). 
Malingering is conceptually more specific than a deviant personality portraying 
untruths. Furthermore, although forensic psychiatric patients are rarely voluntary and
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may be motivated to manage the impression they portray for external gain (i.e. 
avoidance of punishment), we cannot assume that malingering would be their chosen 
form of response distortion in this regard. Other response styles that patients may use 
when being less than objectively truthful include denial and defensiveness and, 
according to evidence it is these response styles that forensic patients are most likely 
to use, not malingering (Rogers & Dickey, 1991). It is not difficult to see how 
exaggerating symptoms (i.e. malingering), would not be the most favourable choice of 
response style for a sex offender seeking to portray a favourable impression to 
evaluators. Furthermore DSM-IV’s inclusion of “uncooperativetiness” as a feature of 
malingering does not fit well with what is currently understood about persons who 
malinger. It has been suggested that malingerers actually appear highly cooperative in 
assessment (Rogers, 1997), frequently seeking out treatment for feigned symptoms, 
and discussing these voluntarily. Playing down or denying symptoms, perhaps in 
attempts to evade contact with services, is in fact an associated feature of many true 
Axis I disorders (e.g. schizophrenia), rather than their malingered counterparts 
(Resnick, 1988).
It is evident then that adherence to a criminological perspective and its associated 
diagnostic criteria in the detection of malingering, might eventuate in lowered 
specificity and sensitivity of detection, risking more false positive (true patients 
diagnosed as malingerers) and false negative (undetected malingerers) classifications.
The Adaptational Model of Malingering
Rogers’ Adaptational Model (1990a) was proposed in order to transcend the 
reductionist conceptualisations of malingering offered by the mad (pathogenic) and 
bad (criminological) perspectives described above. As the name suggests,
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malingering is viewed as an adaptive behaviour, purposefully chosen to fit a particular 
situation. The adaptational perspective assumes that most malingerers attempt to 
resolve difficult circumstances through some form of cost-benefit analysis, in 
accordance with their idiosyncratic context. This cost-benefit analysis is likely to be 
influenced by the individual’s estimation of their abilities to succeed in feigning 
without detection. Malingering is proposed to be more likely to occur when (1) the 
context of the evaluation is perceived as adversarial, (2) personal stakes are very high, 
and (3) no other alternatives appear viable. The Adaptational Model provides the 
broadest and least pejorative explanation of malingering, and affords a template for 
individual case formulation. It also provides a theoretically robust standpoint from 
which to consider avenues for research on detection tools and strategies.
Prototypical analysis -  Which model best describes what is observed clinically?
Because the three explanatory models lack clear parameters (Rogers, 1990a), a 
prototypical analysis was performed (Rogers, Sewell & Goldstein, 1994) to determine 
which model encompassed the most prototypical characteristics of malingering. 320 
forensic experts were asked to rate evaluations of malingering in both forensic and 
non-forensic psychiatric patients, according to prototypical characteristics belonging 
to each explanatory model. Prototypically pathogenic items addressed underlying 
psychopathology, continued deterioration and the development of genuine symptoms. 
Prototypically criminological characteristics included DSM-IV indices supplemented 
by psychopathic characteristics as delineated by the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL: SV; 
Hare et al, 1994). Adaptational items focused on adversarial context and cost-benefit 
analysis. Conclusions from these studies were that the Adaptational Model was the 
most prototypical, followed by the Criminological and Pathogenic models. Focusing 
on non-forensic cases, the pathogenic model was least applicable to feigned cognitive
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impairment. When the distinct components of the Adaptational Model (adversarial 
context and cost benefit analysis) were analysed in isolation, adversarial context 
appeared more applicable to feigned mental disorders than to either feigned cognitive 
impairment or fake medical syndromes. I shall discuss later how an individual’s 
assessment of the fit of malingered symptoms to a given context, is key to how they 
will behave in order to minimise the likelihood of detection, and maximise the 
likelihood of achieving their desired outcome.
The Adaptational Model -  The way forward for research into detection methods
To date, evidence indicates that the Adaptational Model is the most satisfactory in its 
provision as an empirically driven theoretical framework for understanding why 
malingering profiles are observed. Analysis of malingering behaviour from this 
perspective allows us to ask what impression the individual is trying to project (goal), 
and how they are going about it (strategy). For example, given an individual’s 
circumstance and the range of possible outcomes, would this person stand to gain if 
they were to malinger mental illness, cognitive impairment, physical difficulties or 
some combination of these? Anticipating how people might malinger and why, is the 
key to devising detection methods since, if we have knowledge about how an 
individual might go about falsifying symptoms to achieve their goals, we can 
investigate detection models that will allow us to uncover and measure likely 
falsification. Since ultimately detecting malingering involves a judgement call, the 
most useful detection tools and techniques are those that are shown to best 
discriminate between genuine and malingered complaints in a particular setting.
In the remainder of this review I will summarise the literature on observed malingered 
profiles and behaviour across contexts, using an adaptational perspective to consider
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why particular malingered styles and profiles are observed. The properties of useful 
detection tools and techniques will be considered, with the aim of deductively 
customising detection methods for malingered mental illness, to maximise 
discrimination between feigned and genuine complaints. The use of cognitive 
paradigms that might covertly invite an individual to produce a malingered profile that 
is maximally discrepant with that of a genuine patient is considered. Whilst some 
evidence suggests that cognitive profiles are malingered in forensic settings by 
individuals purporting to be mentally ill, these response styles remain relatively 
unresearched. This is perhaps because cognitive symptoms do not encapsulate the 
most salient (positive) symptoms of severe mental illness, and consequently the 
layman is possibly less aware of how they might manifest, and therefore less ‘readily’ 
feigns them. The fact that feigned cognitive symptoms are not as spontaneously 
evidenced by malingerers in forensic settings as positive symptoms, does not mean 
that malingerers do not produce them on tests of cognitive performance if  given the 
opportunity. These ideas are testament to the fact that the cognitive assessment of 
malingered psychopathology is a ripe area for research into detection methods.
HOW DO PEOPLE MALINGER?
Step One -  Cost-benefit analysis -  Do I really want to do this?
The ultimate aim for an individual who has elected to malinger is to evade detection 
and thereby achieve their goal. Malingering occurs only when the stakes are high, 
and the outcome in the event of detection is perceived by the malingerer to be either 
highly aversive (Rogers, 1990a) perhaps in the form of punishment, or unbearably 
regrettable perhaps in the form of the loss of potentially huge compensation monies. 
Furthermore, detected malingering can carry huge penalties depending on the gravity 
of fraud that is judged to have been committed. A litigant malingering symptoms of
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cognitive impairment from a purported head injury at work with the aim of securing a 
compensatory pay-out if detected will undoubtedly endure criminal proceedings, 
resulting in possible loss of his liberty, or crippling financial ruin in the form of a 
counter-sue by his maligned employer. A multiple murderer malingering a psychotic 
profile with the aim of being deemed incompetent to stand trial, in the event of 
detection would be tried not only for his crimes, but also for his fraudulent self­
representation. Such an individual’s sentence would likely be increased to account for 
their lack of remorse and thus augmented risk category. These examples are intended 
to be considered from an adaptational perspective, and hence to illustrate the 
investment with which malingerers pursue their desired outcome. They are not 
intended to align malingering with traits of deviousness and malice, in the tradition of 
the Criminological Model. Malingerers mostly find themselves in desperate 
predicaments where they feel that malingering is their ‘only’ option in evading 
perceived adversity in the form of poverty, prison or perhaps even death (e.g. 
avoidance of the death penalty in the USA). In fact, as illustrated by Rogers’ (1990a) 
explanatory formula for malingering motivation, the higher the stakes, the higher the 
likelihood of malingering.
Step Two - Consider the context -  What form should my malingering take?
So, individuals produce malingered presentations according to the situation in which 
they find themselves, and the way in which they interpret their circumstances in terms 
of possible outcomes.
(a) The forensic context
In forensic settings, it has been demonstrated repeatedly both in simulation and case 
studies, that people malinger (what they believe to be) severe mental illness (Rogers,
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1997). Depression and anxiety would likely involve inappropriate symptomatology to 
render an individual exculpable from his crimes and, although these syndromes are 
malingered, they will not be focused on here. Malingering individuals in forensic 
predicaments generally seek to create the impression that they were ‘out of their 
mind’ at the time of their offence and therefore not responsible for their actions. 
Malingerers may report hallucinations and delusions for example, and whatever 
psychosis-related symptomatology they believe may convincingly demonstrate that 
they were driven to commit the offence by, and that they are indeed suffering from, a 
serious mental illness. A minority of malingerers in forensic settings malinger global 
cognitive impairment, claiming that they have a learning disability or an acquired 
head injury. This sub-type of malingering presents less detection difficulties to 
evaluators as it is usually accompanied by higher-level behaviours that defy the 
possibility of the reported intellectual impairment, and is nonsensical in terms of onset 
and history (Rogers, 1997). Malingerers in forensic settings evidently perceive a 
profile of malingered mental illness to be more adaptive than one of malingered 
neuropsychological impairment (Rogers, Sewell & Goldstein, 1994). Research in the 
area of malingered mental illness has focused on the development of psychiatric 
assessments (e.g. the SIRS, the M-FAST) that discriminate between self-reported 
symptoms of feigned and genuine complainants. This will be discussed in more detail 
later.
(b) The non-forensic context
In medico-legal settings where potential access to compensation as a result of an 
accident or crime exists, the malingering individual is more likely to fake the 
psychological sequelae of a neurological insult, as he sees them. A malingerer 
attempting to produce psychotic symptoms, in the context of apparently having had a
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head injury, would not be very convincing to assessors, who would question the 
medical sense of his presentation. Research in the area of malingered Traumatic 
Brain Injury (TBI), where physical evidence (e.g. scanning) is inconclusive, has 
focused on the development of neuropsychological assessment tools and techniques 
that best discriminate between feigners and genuinely impaired individuals. This will 
be reviewed in a later section of this paper.
Whilst many other psychiatric syndromes such as PTSD and stress-induced anxiety 
are malingered in clinical practice, these will not be focused upon in this review. 
External incentives are potentially available to individuals who are impaired as a 
result of mental health problems. This fact alone dictates that context-relevant 
fabrications will inevitably be produced in a variety of scenarios when stakes are high.
Step Three- What knowledge do I have about what I am faking? -  How do I need 
to behave?
In electing to malinger, an individual’s aim is to convey the responses and behaviour 
of a genuine complainant according to his best knowledge so as to render him 
indiscriminable from ‘the genuine article’. He must develop a strategy according to 
what he understands about the profile he will attempt to produce. The layman’s 
exaggerated and inaccurate understanding of the symptoms and manifestations of both 
mental illness and TBI is well documented (e.g. Resnick, 1988). Also, simulation 
studies have demonstrated that despite this ‘ignorance’ people instructed to feign on 
both psychiatric interviews and neuropsychological measures, believe that they have 
performed markedly more realistically than is the case (Rogers, 1997). These 
misconceptions provide critical information applicable to the development of 
detection methods, since they indicate ways in which malingerers might be identified.
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Although variables such as skill, intelligence and confidence are no doubt relevant, 
one would expect knowledge (in the form of preparation where available) about 
psychiatric profiles to be positively related to ‘malingering skill’, and presumably to 
evading detection. It has however, been variously demonstrated that this is not always 
the case, and provision of literature and information about detection strategies to 
simulating malingerers does not always ‘improve’ malingering (Lezak, 2004). It is 
possible though, that such evidence is an artefact of the simulation paradigm, for it is 
difficult to imagine how a potential malingerer would not be ‘best-advised’ to prepare 
as much as possible before the execution of malingering in order to know ‘what to 
do’. Preparation opportunities in the form of consulting diagnostic manuals, literature 
about detection strategies, documentaries about relevant syndromes might be less 
available to detained malingering offenders than to litigating patients awaiting 
assessment or a court case, although this is not documented in the literature.
Heterogeneity -  No two malingerers are the same
Just as no two patients with mental illness are the same, malingering styles vary 
enormously according to the idiosyncratic combinations of situational and personal 
variables in which they may be encountered (Rogers, 1990a). This heterogeneity 
raises difficulties for clinicians investigating tools and methodologies that will invite 
and capture malingered responses that are common to most malingerers, whilst 
relatively less common to true patients. What is it that all malingerers do that true 
patients do not? Of course such a ‘malingering variable’ has not been located 
(Cornell & Hawk, 1989), and classification decisions must be made on the basis of 
multi-level assessments. Advancements in this area will be discussed later, but large 
standard deviations observed in the responses of simulating malingerers, contribute to
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the difficulty of developing scientifically and statistically viable methods of 
describing and detecting malingering.
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SECTION B: THE ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING
In recognition of the paucity of clinicians’ abilities to detect malingering on the basis 
of clinical judgement alone (Ziskin, 1984), a vast literature has emerged in the pursuit 
of test procedures and techniques that might assist detection (Neis & Sweet, 1994). 
Before discussing clinical advancements in the identification of detection strategies 
and the development of standardised tools and interviews, it should be reasserted that 
malingering presentations are situation and individual specific. Despite the 
development then of norm-based and standardised instruments to detect it, it is not 
‘malingering’ per se that is detectable since ‘malingering’ does not exist as a trait or 
entity in its own right. What is assessed therefore, is whether a particular individual is 
malingering on a particular test, at a particular time, rather than whether an individual 
is a malingerer.
Since the pejorative and antagonistic overtones evoked by the very possibility of 
malingering appear to deter some clinicians even from its consideration, it should be 
clarified at this juncture, that the impetus behind the investigation of malingering is 
the desire to correctly classify genuine patients as well as malingerers. A specific 
malingering evaluation might serve to disprove a clinician’s “intuitive hunch” 
(Rogers, 1997) that a patient’s atypical presentation is not genuine, as well as it might 
add weight to the suspicion of malingering (Halligan, Bass & Oakley, 2003). 
Although the risk of genuine patients being incorrectly classified as malingerers 
cannot be denied, genuine patients need not be fearful of the malingering detection 
endeavour. Since classification of malingering on the basis of test scores is 
probabilistic rather than definitive, the trend in applied malingering research is to 
provide specificity and sensitivity rates for particular instruments at particular cut-off
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scores (e.g. The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) Tombaugh, 1997). In this 
way, evaluators can judge how likely it is that observed scores indicate differential 
decisions, and on this basis quantify the risk of making false positive or negative 
errors. Since valid interpretation of status cannot be accomplished on the basis of test 
scores alone, other sources of information must always be included in an assessment, 
such as a thorough history, the context of the evaluation, and the patient’s attitude 
towards it (Slick, Hopp, Strauss, Hunter & Pinch, 1994). If in doubt, following a 
comprehensive assessment, a clinician should always err on the side of caution and 
not diagnose malingering, since a false positive diagnosis is universally considered to 
be more catastrophic than a false negative one (e.g. Miller, 2001).
SPECIFIC CONCERNS FOR MALINGERING RESEARCH
Demonstrating intentionality
Since gain sought by a malingering individual is necessarily primary, and not covert 
or psychological, it follows that malingering should only be diagnosed where there is 
no doubt as to the individual’s motivation for symptom fabrication. This criterion of 
intentionality gives rise to serious difficulties in the detection and diagnosis of 
malingering, since there are no reliable or valid methods for objectively testing 
whether deception is consciously motivated. In the absence of availability of 
observable external gain and therefore the motivation to malinger, malingering need 
not be suspected or investigated.
Methodology
(a) Simulation studies
Theoretically, detection of malingering can only be verified in individuals who admit 
to having malingered within a particular context. However, this admission rarely
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happens in practice, since the notion of deception is embedded in the very definition 
of malingering, and admission of faking would logically sabotage the fulfilment of 
malingerers’ gains (e.g. insurance payment, or access to drugs). Although some 
research has employed true or “at risk” malingerers, the presupposed unreliability of 
participant responding in this context, has meant that results require measured 
interpretation and may be of limited external validity (Rogers, 1997). Furthermore, 
much ‘real malingerer’ research has been conducted within a forensic setting, where a 
high prevalence of ASPD has lead to premature and spurious conclusions about the 
role of internal or personality variables in the production of malingering profiles. 
More recently research into malingering has employed simulating malingerers, who 
are instructed to fake particular clinical profiles, such as those of severe mental illness 
or brain injury. This allows well-controlled experimental manipulation of variables, 
and systematic comparisons between groups. Using simulators in malingering 
research however, presents a significant external validity problem termed the 
‘simulation-malingering paradox’ (Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1983). Generalising, from 
the performance of simulating ‘malingerers’ to the performance of real ‘fakers’ who 
find themselves in predicaments that afford genuine motivation to present fabricated 
symptoms and to evade detection, is not straightforward. However, these difficulties 
can be minimised through methodological considerations which will be discussed 
later.
(b) Criterion- groups validation
According to Rogers (1997) a substantial minority of simulation studies are missing a 
critical component, namely the clinical comparison group. A study that establishes 
significant differences between healthy controls and simulating malingerers, serves 
only to (possibly) validate that the malingering group were indeed responding
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differently according to instructions to do so. It does not tell us anything about 
malingering since without a clinical comparison group we do not know whether the 
differences found in malingerers would not also be found in genuine patients. 
Methods of detecting malingering are only useful if they discriminate between 
genuine and feigning patients, since malingerers are feigning being patients, not 
feigning being healthy controls!
(c) Known-groups validation
The difficulty of establishing known groups of malingerers has already been 
discussed. However the enormous problem associated with the generalisability of 
results from simulation studies must also be addressed. The use of an “at risk” of 
malingering comparison group in research has become increasingly common, 
although this should perhaps correctly be called a “suspected-group” rather than a 
“known-group” comparison. In this paradigm researchers compare the responses of 
patients who are considered to be likely to be malingering, to the responses of genuine 
patients and healthy controls, in order to increase the (external) validity of an 
instrument in the detection of real malingering. For example, in their research on the 
TOMM, Rees et al., (1998) placed TBI patients who were litigating and who had 
symptoms discrepant with known neurological disease in the “at risk” group, and 
found that the TOMM discriminated between “at risk” and genuine patients.
Miller, in her known-groups validation of the Miller Forensic Assessment of 
Symptoms Test (M-FAST: Miller, 2001) placed patients into “malingering” 
(psychopathology) and “non-malingering” groups according to their scores on the 
Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS: Rogers, Gillis, Dickens & Bagby,
1991), an instrument whose ability to discriminate between these two groups is well
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validated. Briefly, the M-FAST is a 25-item screening interview that provides 
information about the probability of malingered psychiatric illness. Interviewees are 
scored on whether they endorse symptoms that have been demonstrated to be 
erroneously associated with mental illness by malingerers. The SIRS briefly, is a 172- 
item structured interview that has been robustly validated for use in the detection of 
malingered mental illness, and also of other response styles associated with feigning 
(e.g. inconsistency). In her “known-groups” validation referred to above, Miller 
found that the M-FAST discriminated as well as the SIRS between the “malingering” 
and “non-malingering” groups. M-FAST responses of suspected-groups were also 
compared with those of simulating malingerers to provide information about external 
validity. Whilst these examples demonstrate attempts to validate instruments with 
“true” as well as simulating malingerers, they also serve to elucidate the fact that the 
phenomenon of “true malingering” is impossible to isolate for the purposes of 
systematic applied research.
(d) A methodological ‘gold standard’
Rogers (1990b) established three stringent methodological criteria for the validation 
of malingering detection strategies. These were as follows: (1) that findings should 
converge across research designs (i.e. simulation and known groups comparisons); (2) 
that findings should converge across methods of assessment (e.g. structured 
interviews and neuropsychological tests); and (3) that detection strategies should be 
carefully cross validated on clinically diverse samples. These criteria are indeed 
stringent, and few strategies have been validated to this extent (Rogers, 1997). It is 
not difficult though to see the methodological flaws associated with the absence of a 
known-groups comparison, or with pronouncement of an instrument or strategy as 
valid in its detection of malingering without establishing its convergence with other
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tools of known validity. Also, since both true clinical profiles and their malingered 
counterparts have heterogeneous presentations, for an instrument to be robust it 
should be validated on a heterogeneous clinical sample, and should maintain its 
detection power across clinical groups. The TOMM has been validated on 
differentially diagnosed clinical groups, namely TBI (Rees et al, 1998) and mental 
illness (Weinbom, Orr, Woods, Conover & Feix, 2003). This elaborates on Rogers’ 
third criteria giving the TOMM status as a robust and useful instrument for the 
detection of malingering across diagnoses.
BEYOND SUSPICION AND ‘OBSERVED’ INCONSISTENCY -  
MALINGERING INSTRUMENTS
The core of the judgement about whether neuropsychological or psychiatric 
presentations are genuine or feigned is the concept of consistency. Rogers’ ‘Clinical 
Decision Model’ (1997) advises that clinicians should suspect malingering when 
inconsistency is observed in one of the following areas: (1) within the patient’s 
history; (2) between reported symptoms and observed behaviour; (3) between 
reported symptoms and published diagnostic criteria, or (4) across other sources of 
information. Once clinicians have equipped themselves with as much background 
information as possible, and are satisfied that a thorough malingering evaluation is 
warranted, their task is to differentiate, on the basis of scientific knowledge, between 
genuine neurologically- or psychiatrically-based phenomena, and their feigned 
counterparts.
Traditionally different tools and techniques have been empirically established and 
researched according to the malingering context, and the malingering of specific
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profiles. The literature on the assessment of malingered cognitive impairment as 
mostly applied to compensation-seeking contexts will be presented first, followed by 
the literature on the evaluation of malingered severe mental illness, as applied mostly 
to forensic contexts. The scope of this thesis dictates that the following review of 
malingering assessment methods is illustrative rather than exhaustive. The literature 
on malingered cognitive symptoms will be presented in greater detail, since this 
literature provides the empirical and theoretical background for the Empirical Paper 
described in Part II. The literature on assessment of malingered mental illness using 
psychiatric interviews and multi-scale inventories will therefore be described 
comparatively briefly.
ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERED COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT
In the research, detection strategies for feigned cognitive deficits have traditionally 
differed (and continue to do so) from those employed in the detection of malingered 
psychopathology. According to Rogers (1997) “unlike the fabrication o f a mental 
disorder (e.g. a constellation o f symptoms and associated features with a convincing 
onset and course), feigned cognitive deficits do not require the creation o f anything. 
Instead malingerers simply claim “not to know" or appear to expend effort but 
provide an incorrect response.” This idea has underpinned the development of 
strategies and tools for the detection of feigned cognitive impairment, that 
demonstrate responding that is so poor that it defies credulity.
Standard neuropsychological test batteries
Standard neuropsychological tests have been researched for their utility in the 
detection of feigned cognitive impairment, and some discrimination between true and 
feigned performances has been demonstrated. The forward and backward digit-span
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subtests on the WAIS have been shown to be performed consistently less well by 
simulating malingerers than by genuinely impaired patients (e.g. Heaton, Smith, 
Lehman and Vogt, 1978). This is thought to be due to the failure of malingerers to 
appreciate that digit span tests measure attention and concentration rather than 
memory, and also that attention and concentration are relatively preserved in genuine 
TBI patients. Hence malingerers produce scores that are significantly lower than 
those of true patients, allowing discrimination between groups to be made on this 
basis (Lenvin, Benton & Grossman, 1982). Trueblood and Schmidt (1993) also 
demonstrated the utility of the vocabulary and picture completion subtests of the 
WAIS in discriminating between mildly brain-injured (litigating) patients suspected of 
response exaggeration and severely brain injured patients, in a study that reminds us 
that genuine pathology and malingering are not mutually exclusive. Malingering 
(mild TBI) patients were found to deliberately fail items, and also to slow item 
responses. They produced responses indicative of severe impairment, that was 
functionally inconsistent, and that apparently exceeded the impairment of patients 
known to be more impaired in reality. Lezak (2004) provides a summary of the many 
WAIS indices that have been developed from research into observed discrepant score 
profiles of genuine patients, simulating malingerers and suspected malingerers of TBI.
Other standard neuropsychological test batteries have been used in the study of 
malingering, and in fact concern about identifying response distortion on 
neuropsychological tests was first raised in a study using the Halstead-Reitan Battery 
(Heaton, Smith et al, 1978). This work demonstrated how the heterogeneity of 
simulated malingered responses, can inhibit the achievement of consistent, 
statistically significant differences between malingered and genuine responses. 
Multiple studies cited by Lezak (2004) have illustrated this ‘statistical’ difficulty. In
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summary, simulators’ responses have differed across studies on identical tests, both in 
error size and direction, precluding the generation of meaningful and replicable cut­
off scores.
Neuropsychological test batteries are designed to assess complex aspects of cognitive 
functioning and thus may confound with genuine impairment more than specialised 
tests (Lezak, 2004). Correlation on a malingering test, between severity of cognitive 
impairment and malingering is undesirable, since the likelihood of true patients being 
classified as malingering is increased, compromising test specificity. More focused 
malingering research, has examined narrowly defined abilities and disabilities of 
genuine patients, and ways in which they might be measured and operationalised for 
the development of malingering sensitive (and true impairment insensitive) 
instruments. Most of this research into tests and techniques that might ‘capture’ 
malingered cognitive impairment has been in the memory domain.
Memory tests
Memory complaints are very common symptoms in most clinical practice. The 
availability of external incentives in the context of memory impairment, for example 
where a head injury has occurred and may be compensated for financially in the form 
of compensation award or availability of benefits for incapacitation, provides a ripe 
environment for the production of malingered impairment. In such cases, the 
clinician’s task is to differentiate, based on knowledge of pathophysiological 
mechanisms, between genuine memory phenomena and their simulated counterparts. 
In a forensic context, offenders may see an opportunity to escape culpability not only 
through pleading incompetent to stand trial on the basis of psychiatric illness where 
they would logically feign psychopathology, but also on the basis of memory
31
impairment around events surrounding their offences, and thus their having 
committed them.
Much of the earlier evidence on malingered memory impairment stems from the 
procedure commonly referred to as symptom validity testing (SVT) which 
operationalises a two-choice forced recognition paradigm, where the probability of a 
given outcome conforms to a binomial distribution allowing probability levels for 
chance responding to be established (e.g. Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989). In this way, 
responding that produces scores below chance level (i.e. less than 50% correct) 
provides strong evidence that correct responses are being actively avoided, and/or that 
incorrect responses are being actively produced. However, few malingerers perform 
this poorly or believe that true patients do (Lezak, 2004). SVT procedures lacking 
standardised scores other than chance, generate a high number of false negative 
classifications (i.e. they lack specificity), and have questionable face validity. In this 
context this means that they appear too easy to the potential malingerer, and appear to 
be ‘trick tests’ (i.e. tests of malingering). On the whole, SVT methodologies are 
fairly rudimentary, and their use is limited mostly to initially alerting the clinician that 
responding is less than truthful.
More recently, research has centred on the development of specific tests that are 
sensitive to feigned memory impairment, but not sensitive to genuine impairment. 
The requirement of these simultaneous properties is fulfilled by tasks that take 
advantage of the “floor effect strategy” (Rogers, Harrell, & Liff, 1993), which 
assumes that the naive faker will overplay the role, and fail on very simple tasks on 
which genuinely impaired individuals demonstrate competence. The heterogeneity of 
the functional presentations of patients with true memory impairments however,
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contributes to the difficulty of isolating such tasks. Also, the requirement that a task 
is adequately simple so as to be insensitive to genuine impairment whilst retaining 
face validity so as not to deter feigners who may anticipate detection, dictates highly 
specified criteria for tasks that might be utilised in this endeavour. This is 
exemplified by the Rey 15-Item Memory Test (see Lezak, 1983) a very popular test of 
feigned memory impairment in which the patient is asked to reproduce 15 over- 
learned stimuli (letters, numbers and shapes) that are presented to them for a period of 
10 seconds. Despite Lezak’s (1983) recommendation that a score below 9 correctly 
recalled items be used to discriminate feigned from genuine memory impairment, a 
number of studies have shown that this instrument lacks specificity (correct 
identification of non-malingerers) at a variety of cut-off scores and is problematically 
sensitive to learning disabilities, psychiatric disorders and neurological disorders 
(Lezak, 2004). The Rey-15 item recall paradigm has been adapted to accommodate 
the well-documented advantage of recognition over recall memory. A recognition 
component has been attached, demonstrating incremental validity in discriminating 
between feigned (“at risk” group comparison), and genuine memory impairment 
(Boone, Salazar, Wamer-Chacon & Razani, 2002). The general public appears not to 
be cognizant of relative sparing of recognition memory in TBI (Boone, Salazar, 
Wamer-Chacon & Razani, 2002), so malingerers are ‘stumped’ by the fact that they 
(wrongly) believe that they should produce worse scores on recognition than on recall 
tasks. A lower recognition than recall score does not make clinical sense and is not 
seen in the majority of patients and healthy controls. Malingerers have also been 
classified by higher recall than recognition scores on the Auditory Verbal Learning 
Test (Lezak, 2004).
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The TOMM (Tombaugh, 1996), a visual recognition test that uses pictures of 
common objects as stimuli, is the most recently developed and robustly validated test 
of malingered memory impairment. This test has been demonstrated to achieve high 
levels of sensitivity and specificity with different types of participant (university 
students, TBI patients, hospital outpatients), different types of experimental designs 
(simulation, “at risk” groups) and different procedures for presenting stimulus 
material (computer, paper-and-pencil). The qualities of the TOMM that account for 
its impressive discriminatory power between genuine and feigned memory 
impairment will be outlined in the summary at the end of this section.
Other cognitive tests
Tests developed and used in the detection of feigned cognitive impairment have not 
been exclusively in the domain of memory. Other domains have also been explored, 
and hypothesised discriminatory power has relied on the fact that the lay public holds 
many inaccurate beliefs regarding the neuropsychological consequences of head 
injury (Wilier, Johnson, Rempel & Linn, 1993). As summarised by Boone, Salazar, 
Lu, Wamer-Chacon and Razani (2002), the general public seems to assume that brain 
injury causes losses (apart from memory) in basic attention span, over-learned 
information and motor strength and dexterity, when in actuality these domains are 
relatively preserved in all but the most severely brain-injured patients. Using this 
information, tests have been developed to capture malingered losses in mental 
speed/calculation ability such as The Dot Counting Test (Lezak, 1995). Boone et al. 
(2002) in their malingering study using the Dot Counting Test, found that they could 
correctly classify malingered mental illness and malingered cognitive impairment 
using this test, highlighting differential profiles across the two malingered diagnostic 
groups. In another study, Boone at al’s (2000) generation of scores based on unique
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types of error on a sight reading task (the b Test) made only by TBI malingerers and 
not genuine patients, further illustrates the usefulness of this paradigm (distinctive 
error type) in the discrimination between feigned and genuine cognitive impairment.
‘Commission errors’
Benton and Spreen (1961) investigated the response profiles of college simulators and 
genuinely impaired (TBI) patients on the Benton Visual Retention Test (BVRT), 
noting that malingerers made less omission errors that true patients, but more 
distortion errors. This overall error profile of simulating malingerers has been 
systematically replicated (Lezak, 2004). Bruhn and Reade (1975) found that on the 
Bender-Gestalt test of constructional praxis, patients with genuine impairment tended 
to simplify and omit aspects of drawings that they copied from memory, whereas 
malingerers complicated them, demonstrating a kind of cognitive sophistication and 
flexibility in ‘committed’ rather than ‘omitted’ errors. Bruhn and Reade also found 
that true patients’ distortions were consistent across drawings according to genuine 
(dis)ability. Malingered distortions however, were inconsistent according 
(presumably) to strategic inconsistency. Some kinds of distortions (e.g. rotations) 
were made only by true patients. These more ‘sophisticated’ distortions, pertaining to 
genuine patient difficulties, were not evidenced in malingerers, whose knowledge or 
imagination about genuine impairments did not extend to them. These findings 
indicate that knowledge of the kinds of errors that genuine patients do or don’t make 
on particular tests, which are counter-intuitive to what a malingerer or layman might 
imagine, affords useful ammunition for the clinician. Cognitive tests that invite the 
commission of such errors in the malingerer are likely then to be useful as tools that 
will discriminate in a concrete way between genuine and feigned impairments. Such 
paradigms might enhance the true positive identification of malingerers, whilst
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minimising the false positive identification of true patients as feigners, as they 
qualitatively (error-type not amount) differentiate between the two groups. This 
potentiates the generation of scores that maximise the difference between genuine and 
feigning groups, and minimise score overlap across groups
Boone et al. (2000) in their work on malingered cognitive deficits demonstrated that 
commission error in the form of false positive identification of letters in a visual letter 
discrimination task, was the variable that best discriminated between malingerers and 
true patients (across TBI and schizophrenia clinical comparison groups). This 
variable was far superior in classification accuracy than was the omission error 
variable, where participants neglected the identification of correct responses. 
Omission in this context may confound with genuine impairment and indeed some 
patients with schizophrenia and head injury were found to produce some omission 
errors. However, commission errors were seen almost exclusively in the malingering 
group, which comprised litigating TBI patients. It appears that commission-type 
errors in this study, indicated a wilful (i.e. malingered) distortion on the part of the 
responder, allowing researchers to qualitatively distinguish between groups using a 
categorical (error-type) rather than a continuous (error amount) error-index. In their 
study mentioned above employing the Rey Dot Counting Test with malingerers who 
had evidenced malingering on valid diagnostic tools (i.e. not simulators), Boone et al 
(2002) again found that TBI malingerers were discriminable from other groups using 
a commission error score. TBI patients did not commit the same errors as 
malingerers, but tended instead to omit correct responses. Suspected malingerers of 
mental illness however, were not found to commit (false-positive) errors on this test, 
and were distinct from all other groups in the amount of time (i.e. longer) taken to 
complete tasks.
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A summary of desirable parameters for cognitive malingering tests
The summary of the literature on the assessment of malingered cognitive impairment 
that has been presented above assists in the elucidation of criteria that render 
particular cognitive tests or paradigms useful in the quest for tools that will ‘invite’ 
discrepant responses from malingerers that are not seen in true patients. These are as 
follows:
(1) Face validity -  If the perceived difficulty of a test exceeds its actual difficulty, 
malingerers will produce scoring patterns commensurate with this perception, 
discriminant from their genuine counterparts. The more difficult the task 
appears, the worse the malingerer will perform and the easier his detection 
will be (e.g. Rees at al., 1998). Strategies have been effectively used to 
enhance the perceived difficulty of tasks in order to invite ‘better’ malingering 
such as using smaller print (e.g. Boone et al., 2000) in the ‘more difficult’ 
phase of a task, or stressing the brevity of time available to complete (a very 
simple) task. Easy tasks, which are perceived to be difficult, are not 
transparent as ‘malingering’ tasks, and therefore possess necessary face 
validity.
(2) Tasks should not be sensitive to cognitive impairment, but they should be 
perceived to be so. If tasks are sensitive to genuine impairment this should be 
outweighed by their sensitivity to malingered impairment. Tasks should also 
not be sensitive to demographic variables such as age, gender, or to 
differential (and possibly comorbid) diagnoses such as depression or other 
mental illness.
The most effortful malingerers apply their knowledge of genuine impairment in the 
production of profiles that they believe to be as realistic as possible. When presented
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with a task then, they must process the stimuli, determine a correct response, and then 
decide whether to respond truthfully or to falsify their answer (Rees et al., 1998). 
This would indicate that test paradigms where stimuli requiring individual responses 
are presented in a staccato format that does not allow malingerers time to use this 
strategy, might be useful in eliciting discrepant and confused responding. Also, if 
paradigms that elicit automatic responses are presented, this strategy of calculating 
‘suitable’ and ‘realistic’ responses might be precluded in the malingerer. The latter is 
hypothesised to be a particularly useful area of inquiry, since automatic, or 
preattentive processing is relatively well preserved in patients with both cognitive and 
psychiatric impairment (Anscombe, 1987) compared with effortful processing. Such 
tasks then would satisfy the lack of confound of genuine impairment and task ability 
desirable in malingering sensitive tasks.
ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERED MENTAL ILLNESS
In a litigious society where pecuniary gain or criminal exculpation may rest on the 
presence or absence of various psychiatric syndromes, a determination of the presence 
of malingering can be essential (Roger, 1997). Given that most mental disorders are 
diagnosed primarily on the basis of subjective symptoms, and that DSM guidelines 
for discrimination between genuine and feigned psychiatric entities is limited, the 
possibility for diagnostic error is substantial. Whilst Cornell and Hawk (1989) 
acknowledged that the core problem in developing diagnostic criteria for malingering 
is the lack of an unequivocal “gold standard” of malingering, they highlighted 
endorsement of bogus symptoms, expression of suicidal ideation, absurd replies, 
memory problems and reporting of visual hallucinations as key differentiators 
between true and ‘faking’ psychiatric patients. Furthermore, they noted that 
malingered ‘symptoms’ did not cohere and cluster into known diagnostic entities.
38
Clinicians’ poor rates of classification of malingered mental illness have been 
described, and consequent attempts to research malingering detection methods 
initially employed existent multi-scale personality inventories. These laid the 
groundwork for the development of more specific tests of malingered mental illness. 
Developments in these two areas of the assessment of malingered mental illness shall 
be briefly outlined below. Research into detection methods for malingered mental 
illness explores the utility of instruments that measure the patient’s subjective 
endorsement (or not) of symptoms and experiences. It does not comprise any 
performance driven (i.e. cognitive) indicators of malingered mental illness, although 
evidence suggests that this might be a useful area of inquiry (e.g. Boone et al., 2002).
Multi-scale personality inventories
The first approach employs existing intelligence and personality measures, of which 
the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, 
Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) is the most widely used and researched. 
Myriad MMPI “dissimulation scales” have been developed based on comparisons of 
differential response patterns of various groups, including healthy controls instructed 
to “exaggerate” true responding (e.g. Anthony, 1971), simulating malingerers, true 
patients and randomly generated computer responses. (See Ben-Porath, Graham, 
Hall, Hirschman & Zaragoza et al., 1995, for a summary of this work).
The MMPI-2 consists of a large number (370) of forced choice items, accounting for 
its amenability to complex large-scale empirical and statistical analyses, where 
optimal cut-off points for determining specific group inclusion, such as 
malingered/non-malingered responding, can be generated. Scales to detect 
inconsistency of response scatter, inconsistency of item endorsement, inaccuracy of
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item endorsement, and many more unreliable response styles have been developed 
and are summarised by Greene (1988). Distinctive terms used in the development of 
these scales however, such as ‘sub-optimal effort’ and ‘inconsistent responding’, 
appear to be ‘replaced’ by the term ‘malingering’ in discussions of diagnostic 
conclusions, in a way that is obviously extrapolative and problematic. The difficulties 
that this raises in synthesising the literature on the assessment of malingering was also 
discussed with reference to the literature on assessment of malingered cognitive 
impairment.
Although effective in the detection of dishonest responding, the time administration of 
the MMPI-2 is lengthy, and its utility varies markedly between populations (Ben- 
Porath, Graham, Hall, Hirschman & Zaragoza et al., 1995), according to the 
robustness of the particular index or scale used, in terms of its criterion validity and 
also its relevance to the context in which it is applied. Clinicians must determine 
which scale is appropriate for a particular setting and whether raising or lowering cut 
off scores would facilitate the most reliable detection rates of malingering. The base 
rates of malingering occurrence in a particular setting should be known, and the 
consequences of false positive (misidentifying) and false negative (not identifying) 
classifications is a mandatory consideration in determining which cutting scores 
should be used and whether a cutting score should be modified. It is also 
recommended that a number of scales be used in conjunction with one another to 
further validate hypothesised reasoning about elevated scores. This is particularly 
important since measures of malingering on the MMPI are confounded by measures 
of true symptomatology (e.g. the F-Scale, Dalstrom et al., 1972, F minus K Index, 
Gough, 1950), and because the magnitude of this confound will likely fluctuate 
according to setting. For example, the confound of genuine pathology with
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malingering indicators on the MMPI will be larger in inpatient than outpatient 
forensic settings where more pervasive symptoms, would be expected.
Other personality inventories provide some means of assessing malingering, and 
include items designed to measure dishonest and inconsistent responding. The 
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI: Morey, 1991) and the Millon Clinical 
Multi axial Inventory (MCMI-III: Millon 1978, 1994) for example, contain the 
Debasement and the Negative Impression scales respectively, which suggest a degree 
of complaint exaggeration. Additional indexes have been developed to detect 
malingering on these instruments. The application and development of these indices 
shall not be elaborated here, as they are less well validated than the MMPI scales, and 
are useful mainly in their determination of generic dissimulation, rather than of 
malingering. More specific malingering tests have been developed whose utility and 
specificity in the detection of malingered psychopathology far outweighs that of the 
multi-scale personality inventories.
Specific tests of malingered mental illness
The M-Test (Baeber, Marston, Michelli & Mills, 1985) was the first attempt to 
develop a screening measure specifically to detect malingered mental illness. Its 
utility was based on the differential endorsement of malingered (M-scale) and genuine 
(S-scale) psychiatric symptoms by simulating malingerers and patients. Malingered 
items on this scale comprise non-existent entities, and atypical hallucinations and 
delusions, and were shown to be endorsed at a higher rate by simulating malingerers 
than by true patients (Baeber, Marston, Michelli & Mills, 1985). However, 
difficulties with the external validation of this instrument (Gillis, Rogers & Bagby,
41
1991) and also with its problematically large confound with true pathology (Schretlen,
1992), have resulted in it being superseded by newer instruments.
Interview techniques are currently the most common approach applied to the detection 
of malingered mental illness. Rogers (1990a) proposed a classificatory model of 
malingering that incorporated four well-established strategies that were applicable to 
clinical interviews. This model was generated through analysis of the psychometric 
and social psychological malingering literature to date, and through a systematic 
assessment of the validity of evidence presented according to rigorous methodological 
standards. Rogers’ model considered detection strategies to be adequately validated if 
they met the following criteria: (1) validated by both simulation design and known- 
groups comparison; (2) established by multiple assessment methods (e.g. interviews 
and multiscale inventories) and (3) replicated in multiple studies encompassing 
clinically diverse samples. Rogers found that four detection strategies for feigned 
psychopathology had been adequately validated across research designs and methods 
of assessment. These strategies were composed of rare symptoms, indiscriminate 
symptom endorsement, obvious symptoms and improbable symptoms, and the SIRS 
(Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992) was developed to operationalise them within a 
standardised interview format.
The SIRS is a 172-item structured interview that enquires about patient’s experiences 
of (malingered psychiatric) symptoms. It is established as a standard method for the 
assessment of malingering and has a high level of reliability and well-established 
validity. In addition, the SIRS appears unparalleled in its ability to distinguish 
between feigned and genuine disorders (Rogers, 1997). However, Rogers (1997) 
emphasises that despite the impressive classification accuracy of the SIRS, it alone
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cannot be used to ‘diagnose’ malingering. The determination of malingering requires 
a multi-method assessment, which incorporates and integrates data from unstructured 
interviews, collateral sources, and psychological tests.
The M-FAST (Miller, 2001) is a more recently developed tool, which has also been 
robustly validated across various patients and malingering samples. Like the SIRS, 
it is used routinely as a screening tool for malingered mental illness and is advantaged 
by the brevity of its administration time (approximately 10 minutes). It assesses the 
endorsement of atypical, inconsistent and incongruent psychiatric symptoms, finding 
that malingerers commonly endorse these (malingered) symptoms, where true patients 
do not. Whilst the M-FAST discriminates between true and malingered mental illness 
with an impressive degree of accuracy, scores on the M-FAST do correlate positively 
with true symptomatology in true patients. The M-FAST manual like that of the 
SIRS emphasises the absolute need for corroborative data in support of malingering 
classifications made on this instrument.
In summary then, the screening of malingered mental illness commences 
predominantly with an assessment of whether individuals endorse experiencing 
atypical, bogus or inconsistent symptoms that research has shown are not endorsed, 
(or not endorsed in the same way), by genuine patients. This trend has resulted from 
(and in), the development of highly validated screening tools that assess in this 
subjective symptom-reporting domain (e.g. the SIRS and the M-FAST). Following 
this broad review, which in Section B has focused on the cognitive assessment of 
malingering (mostly in a malingered TBI context) I will present my Empirical Paper 
which describes an applied investigation into the utility of a cognitive test battery in 
the detection of malingered mental illness using a fully controlled simulation design.
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PART II: EMPIRICAL PAPER
ABSTRACT
Previous research has shown that persons malingering mental illness feign cognitive 
as well as psychiatric symptoms if given the opportunity to do so (e.g. Clark, 1988, 
Boone et al., 2002). This research aimed to investigate whether it was possible to 
develop a multi-method cognitive assessment battery, which would validly 
discriminate between persons simulating mental illness and genuine patients. Six 
indices including tasks based on the iconic memory paradigm (Sperling, 1960) and the 
pop-out paradigm (Treisman & Souther, 1985), and an interview-based measure of 
malingered cognitive symptoms (CDQ) were administered to simulating malingerers, 
true patients and healthy controls (total n= 105) in a fully controlled simulation 
design. Scores on each index were converted into stanine scores, and these were 
combined to create a single (mean) composite score of malingered cognitive 
symptoms. The M-FAST (Miller, 2001) and the Rey Memory Test (Lezak, 1983) 
were also administered in order that classifications based on the Malingered Cognitive 
Symptoms Test Battery (MCSTB) could be compared with those based on 
performances on these established tests of malingering. ROC curve analyses 
demonstrated that the MCSTB was able to discriminate between true patients and 
malingerers with a high degree of accuracy (AUC = 0.829) when 6 indices were 
combined to form the composite stanine score. However 2 components of the 
MCSTB did not discriminate between true patients and malingerers, namely RMT 
scores and total recall scores on the iconic memory paradigm task. When these tasks 
were omitted from the composite MCSTB stanine score computation, the AUC 
statistic was marginally increased (AUC = 0.855). Whilst the MCSTB was 
marginally less effective than the M-FAST (AUC = 0.923) in discriminating between 
true patients and simulating malingerers, using a combination of the M-FAST and the
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MCSTB produced higher classification specificity, resulting in less false positive 
classifications than the use of the M-FAST alone in this sample group. Whilst the use 
of the MCSTB alone was less sensitive and less specific than the M-FAST in the 
classification of simulating malingerers, the MCSTB identified 4 ‘known’ malingerers 
who did not malinger on the M-FAST. Furthermore, true pathology as measured by 
the BSI (Derogatis, 1993) was significantly correlated with true patient scores on the 
M-FAST but not with those on the MCSTB. These findings might suggest that the 
M-FAST and the MCSTB measure distinct domains of malingering (i.e. psychiatric 
and cognitive) within malingered mental illness. The MCSTB appears to hold 
considerable promise as an assessment tool for the specific assessment of malingered 
cognitive deficits in severe mental illness.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2000 Rogers and Cruise estimated malingered mental illness to occur in 
approximately one sixth of all forensic psychiatric cases. Any prevalence estimate 
however, is likely to underestimate the true occurrence of malingering, since it will 
logically exclude ‘successful’ malingerers who elude the attention of clinicians 
(Rogers, 1997). Whatever the prevalence, the cost of undetected malingering to 
forensic psychiatric services in terms of money, time and energy commitment is likely 
to be substantial (Rogers, 1997). Undetected malingered mental illness is a concern 
for clinicians in forensic services (Broughton & Chesterman, 2001), and detection 
based on standard clinical interviews is likely to be insubstantial (Ziskin, 1984). 
According to the Adaptational Model of Malingering (Rogers, 1990a) the potential 
availability of external gains (e.g. exculpation from offences, sentence reduction) on 
the basis of severe mental illness motivates some individuals to feign or exaggerate 
(what they believe to be) the symptoms of severe mental illness.
The recognised paucity of clinical detection strategies and the impact of malingering 
on mental health service resources reinforces the importance of developing 
empirically driven methods for the assessment of malingered mental illness (Rogers, 
1997). Yet, as acknowledged by Cornell and Hawk (1989), research efforts in the 
development of malingering sensitive instruments is hampered by the lack of an 
unequivocal “gold standard” of malingering. Just as no two patients with mental 
illness are the same, malingering styles vary enormously according to the 
idiosyncratic combinations of situational and personal variables in which they may be 
encountered (Rogers, 1990a). The symptoms that an individual feigns will depend 
principally on their understanding of their malingered condition. Malingered
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presentations will vary according to the individual’s experience, preparation and skill 
in assuming their malingered ‘role’ (Pankratz & Binder, 1997). The heterogeneity of 
malingering styles raises difficulties for detecting clinicians since, in the aim of 
standardisation, assessment methods should “invite” common profiles in malingerers. 
To minimise false positive identification, malingering detection methods must 
discriminate between true and malingered responding. A pivotal question therefore is 
-  What symptoms do malingerers “evidence” that true patients do not?
Existing research in malingered mental illness, has almost exclusively examined this 
question in the area of malingered psychiatric (as opposed to cognitive) symptoms. 
Studies have typically adopted a “fully controlled” simulation design (Schretlen, 
1988) to compare the responses of simulating malingerers of mental illness, criterion 
groups (genuine patients) and healthy controls. This methodological paradigm can 
provide preliminary base-rate information on true and ‘malingered’ performances on 
psychological tests (Schretlen, 1988). However, whilst determining that a test 
discriminates between simulators and true patients with mental illness is significant, 
generalisability to “real” malingerers is limited, and findings should be replicated with 
“real” malingerers. Undetected malingerers are unavailable to researchers, and test 
validation on groups “at-risk” of malingering offers superior external validity than the 
use of simulators alone (Rogers, 1990b). Individuals have been considered to be “at- 
risk” of malingering if scores on previously validated instruments have indicated 
malingering. For example in one of Miller’s “known-groups” validations of the M- 
FAST (Miller, 2001), likelihood of true malingering of mental illness is established on 
the basis of scores on the SIRS (Rogers, Bagby & Dickens 1992). Whilst Rogers’ 
stringent methodological criteria for validation of malingering detection strategies 
(1990b) require that adequately validated instruments demonstrate validity with
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“known-groups”, simulation paradigms are uniquely placed in their use in research 
into detection methods. It would be profligate to consider validating detection 
methods with (difficult to find and validate) “known-groups”, without these methods 
having been developed within a simulation methodology.
The M Test (Baeber, Marston, Michelli & Mills, 1985) was the first attempt to 
develop a screening measure specifically to detect (simulated) malingered psychiatric 
symptoms, evidencing discriminability between genuine and feigned symptoms in 
schizophrenia. Simulating malingerers were found to endorse nonexistent and 
atypical symptoms that true patients did not (Baeber, Marson, Michelli & Mills, 
1985). These findings have not however been replicated with suspected malingerers 
(Gillis, Rogers & Bagby, 1991), and malingering on the M Test may be significantly 
confounded with genuine functional impairment (Schretlen, 1992). Risk of false 
positive classification of genuine patients must be quantified and minimised in 
detection methods, though it is less of a concern in screening instruments, because 
clinicians are strongly recommended to obtain corroborating data (Miller, 2001).
Since severity of genuine mental illness might arguably reduce the reliability of self- 
report (Ben-Porath, Graham, Hall, Hirschman & Zaragoza, 1995) and increase the 
likely endorsement of ‘unusual’ experiences (Miller, 2001), tests measuring self- 
reported psychiatric symptoms are inevitably confounded with true symptomatology. 
It is advisable that detection methods be validated in (several) heterogeneous criterion 
groups, and that cut-off scores be generated, and adjusted in accordance with the 
clinical (malingering) base rates of the applicable context (Rogers, 1997). For 
example, classification cut-off scores developed using a sample of acutely unwell 
psychiatric patients cannot be reliably applied to the assessment of suspected
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malingerers of mental illness in an outpatient setting, without adjustment according to 
base-rates.
The SIRS (Rogers, Bagby, Gillis, 1992) and the M-FAST (Miller, 2001) are the two 
most robustly validated screening instruments for malingered mental illness in clinical 
practice today. These structured interviews ask respondents to endorse or refute, rare, 
indiscriminant, improbable or obvious psychiatric symptoms. Since not all simulating 
or known malingerers are identifiable on these instruments, and the confound of true 
mental illness results in a certain probability of misclassifying some (perhaps the most 
unwell) true patients, classification should be corroborated with further evidence of 
malingering (Rogers, 1997, Miller, 2001). Classifications of malingered mental 
illness on the basis of psychiatric screening instruments such as the SIRS and the M- 
FAST can be incrementally validated with evidence of malingering on tests assessing 
in a distinct (i.e. performance based) domain (Rogers, 1997). Evidence of 
malingering on various instruments, across distinct domains, psychiatric but also 
additionally the cognitive, affords incremental validity to the likelihood of correctly 
classifying malingerers (Halligan, Bass & Oakley, 2003).
Cognitive neuropsychological tests offer objective information based on performance 
and behaviour distinct from that gathered on psychiatric malingering assessments (e.g. 
M-FAST). Instead of endorsing a constellation of symptoms that are ‘suggested’ by 
the interviewer (e.g. M-FAST, Miller 2001), cognitive tests require respondents to 
perform and behave the malingered profile they wish to portray. Producing 
convincing cognitive symptoms might require a different kind of knowledge and 
sophistication on the part of the malingerer, particularly since the cognitive profile of 
mental illness is less salient (i.e. visible) than overt psychiatric symptoms. Indeed the
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potential malingerer might be less aware of cognitive symptoms in mental illness, and 
so less able to malinger them realistically.
Evidence exists that malingerers of mental illness feign cognitive impairment in the 
context of pseudoschizophrenic presentations, reporting being confused, and having 
difficulties with attention, concentration and memory (e.g. Clark, 1988). These 
reported cognitive difficulties can be operationalised, measured and thus validated 
with the use of neuropsychological tests. The likely veracity of these symptoms can 
be objectively tested with reference to empirically derived normative data on the 
performance patterns of genuine patients and malingerers. This performance data can 
be verified or falsified in a way that is free of the ultimate subjectivity of self-reported 
psychiatric symptoms (e.g. hallucinations and delusions), which cannot be 
scientifically examined in the same way (Popper, 1959). Also with cognitive 
performance-based tests, contextual influences (e.g. social desirability in the presence 
of an interviewer) can be limited, further augmenting the objectivity of responses.
Specific malingering tests developed to discriminate between genuine and feigned 
cognitive impairment in traumatic brain-injury (TBI), have been applied to the context 
of malingered mental illness with varying success (e.g. Back et al., 1996). Some 
memory-based tests that discriminate powerfully between genuine and feigned 
cognitive impairment in the brain-injury population, have been shown to confound 
problematically with psychiatrically based cognitive impairment (e.g. Hiscock 
Forced-choice Method, Back et al., 1996). Use of these tests then for the assessment 
of malingered mental illness would elevate the risk of false positive identification of 
true psychiatric patients as malingerers.
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It is not surprising that manifestations of cognitive symptoms or impairment differ 
according to context and source (Boone et al., 2002). One would not expect patients 
with schizophrenia to perform similarly to patients with brain injury on tests of 
cognition. Normative performance data are not interchangeable, or instruments 
indiscriminately useful in the assessment of malingering across diagnoses. Although 
unsophisticated malingerers of mental illness might be expected to grossly exaggerate 
cognitive impairment on psychological tests, non-credible patients drawn from TBI 
and psychiatric settings have been shown to employ differing approaches in their 
fabrication of cognitive symptoms (Boone et al, 2002). Forensic and non-forensic 
patients suspected of malingering were found to produce qualitatively distinct errors 
on the Rey Dot Counting Test, underlying the importance of producing empirically 
derived normative data relevant to the population in which suspected malingering is 
being assessed (Boone et al, 2002). Bespoke cut-off scores, maximising sensitivity 
and specificity of malingering classification were generated in the above study, for 
each diagnostic context.
The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM: Tombaugh, 1996), although developed 
and validated for the detection of malingered cognitive impairment in the context of 
TBI (Rees, Tombaugh, Gansler & Moczynski, 1998), has recently been applied to a 
forensic psychiatric setting (Weinbom, Orr, Woods, Conover & Feix, 2003). A 
“known-groups” design was used, in which forensic psychiatric patients were 
considered to be at higher risk of malingering cognitive impairment if their 
Competency to Stand Trial (CST) was under evaluation. Responses on the TOMM of 
“at risk” patients were compared with those of mentally ill forensic patients who were 
not suspected of malingering cognitive impairment (Weinbom, Orr, Woods, Conover 
& Feix, 2003). Findings supported the utility and predictive validity of the TOMM in
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this population. Whilst this study illustrates a prevalence of malingered cognitive 
symptoms (specifically memory) in the context of mental illness, this sample was not 
suspected of malingering mental illness, but of malingering cognitive impairment in 
the context of being genuinely mentally ill. This distinction further supports the need 
to develop malingering tests (with context/diagnosis-specific norms and cut-off 
scores) that assess malingering across psychiatric and cognitive modalities. Specific 
context-led malingering assessment is advisable, since multifarious potential 
combinations of true and malingered performance exist within the same individual. 
For example, Person A might have genuine cognitive impairment (resulting from 
TBI) and be questionably malingering severe mental illness. An appropriately 
tailored malingering assessment might consist of a psychiatric screening assessment 
(e.g. the SIRS) followed by corroborative data evidencing malingered cognitive 
symptoms of mental illness (i.e. not resulting from TBI). On the other hand Person B 
might have a genuine mental illness (consistent onset, course etc.) and be suspected of 
malingering cognitive impairment in a litigating context. A malingering assessment 
in this scenario, must distinguish between genuine psychiatrically-based, and 
malingered cognitive impairment (TBI ‘type’).
So, severe mental illness manifests in cognitive symptoms in some patients, and 
individuals malingering mental illness might feign on tests of cognition, producing the 
cognitive profiles they perceive to be associated with their malingered condition. This 
group of malingerers perform distinctly from individuals malingering TBI (Boone et 
al., 2002) presumably because they associate mental illness and TBI with distinct 
cognitive deficits/performance. Research into malingered TBI detection has focused 
on the development of instruments that discriminate between true and feigned 
profiles, and viable assessment tools possess common qualities. For example, the
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utility of the TOMM and its impressive cross-methods, cross-sample validation (Rees 
et al., 1998) is attributable to its face validity as a test of malingering (i.e. perceived 
difficulty exceeds actual difficulty) and to its insensitivity to true (TBI) pathology. 
The TOMM is also insensitive to demographic variables, educational level and to IQ 
(Rees et al., 1998). This information can be used to construct hypotheses about what 
paradigms of cognitive tasks and abilities might be usefully tested in the aim of 
developing a bespoke methodology for the assessment of malingered cognitive 
symptoms in severe mental illness. The pivotal inquiry in this endeavour then is: 
What aspects of cognition are unaffected in severe mental illness, but might be 
considered by the layman (i.e. potential malingerer) to be “distorted”?
Since detailed knowledge about genuine symptomatology is the clinician’s greatest 
asset in recognising malingered profiles (Resnick, 1988), the cognitive profile of 
severe mental illness is considered. I will specifically consider schizophrenia in this 
context, since this is the most commonly malingered profile in a forensic psychiatric 
setting (Resnick, 1988). Primary abnormalities in schizophrenia are typically 
conceptualised in terms of positive symptoms, including derailment, tangentiality, 
incoherence, illogicality, circumstantiality, pressure and distractible speech 
(Andreasen, Amdt, Alliger, Miller & Flaum, 1995). Existing research suggests that a 
range of cognitive impairments are associated with these abnormalities, including 
deficits in attention, working memory, anterograde memory and executive functioning 
(Hogarty & Fletcher, 1992). Attention is of particular interest here since, not only 
does evidence exist that particular aspects of attention are comparatively preserved in 
schizophrenia (Anscombe, 1987), but also, tasks that operationalise these preserved 
abilities have been developed and researched in the cognitive (e.g. Sperling 1960), 
and cognitive developmental psychology literature (e.g. Treisman & Souther, 1985).
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Attention can be divided into two sub-categories: preattentive (automatic), and 
selective (effortful). The literature on “preattentive processing” (Neisser, 1967) in 
schizophrenia is limited and equivocal, with some studies suggesting intactness 
(Schwartz & Winstead, 1985) and others impairment (Lubow, Kaplan, Abramovich, 
Rudnick & Laor, 2000). However, the relative preservation of preattentive compared 
with selective processing in schizophrenia is well documented (e.g. Anscombe 1987). 
This is not surprising, since preattentive processing is considered to be analogous to 
automatic reflexes, requiring no conscious input (i.e. only sensory) from the 
processor. Effortful processing however, requires directed and interpretive aspects of 
cognition, abnormalities of which are central to the schizophrenic process (Garety & 
Freeman, 1999).
The “pop-out effect” (Treisman & Souther, 1985) refers to the automatic way in 
which a target stimulus presented with homogenous distractors “pops-out”, and can be 
identified without effortful (or serial) searching. The size of a pop-out effect, and so 
the automaticity (i.e. speed) with which a target can be identified in a field of 
distractors is dependent upon the size and nature of the feature whose presence, or 
absence denotes the distinction (Treisman & Gormican, 1988). Research using 
forced-choice paradigms in which targets differ from distractors on one dimension 
only (i.e. presence or absence of a feature) has evidenced a variety of parameters such 
as line orientation, colour, presence or absence of intersecting lines that can cause 
stimuli to “pop-out” (Treisman & Souther, 1985). An incomplete circle for example, 
has a preattentively detectable feature (i.e. a gap) that distinguishes it (almost 
immediately) from a group of intact circles, without any effort on the part of the 
processor. Furthermore, Treisman and Souther (1985) noted that search latencies for 
determining whether a pop-out target is present or absent do not increase linearly with
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the amount of distractors. This fact demonstrates that pop-out qualities of the target 
stimulus make it difficult not to see it, and also that the automatic effortless 
processing of “pop-out” stimuli is difficult to interfere with and to over-ride. In other 
words, in a pop-out paradigm, one cannot help but see the popping-out stimulus. So, 
not only would individuals with normal functioning be expected to perform pop-out 
search tasks very quickly, they would also be expected to do so at a very low error 
rate (Treisman & Souther, 1985).
In the above example, where the pop-out feature (located in the target stimulus) is the 
gap in the circle, the processor preattentively determines the presence or absence of 
this feature. If however the pop-out feature were to be located in the distractors and 
the target stimulus was a unique complete circle, the pop-out effect would be lost. 
Effortful (reflected in higher response latencies) processing is required to identify the 
presence or absence of the new target, as it does not possess a pop-out feature. Not 
only would individuals be expected to perform more slowly on this task, but they may 
also be expected to make more errors (Treisman & Gromican, 1988).
The pop-out paradigm presents a unique opportunity to operationalise the 
measurement of a type of processing that is, if not completely spared in severe mental 
illness, is largely unaffected compared with higher forms of processing. It is further 
hypothesised that pop-out tasks might have face validity as malingering tests, as they 
appear illusorily difficult, since they are timed and require respondents to quickly 
identify apparently subtle visual differences (e.g. presence or absence of a tiny gap in 
one circle). Instructions given to respondents can be manipulated in order to enhance 
face validity (in malingerers) and perceived task difficulty.
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The iconic memory construct (Sperling, 1960) potentially offers another cognitive 
paradigm in which genuine and malingered cognitive impairment in the context of 
severe mental illness may be discriminable. Individuals are able to recall a high rate 
of letters that have been displayed for almost imperceptible periods (e.g. 50-250 
milliseconds, Sperling, 1960) if asked to do so without delay. Iconic memory is a 
preattentive function, and displayed letters remain in a fast-decaying store without 
being processed for a short period (Sperling, 1960). Due to the lack of effortful 
processing entailed in correct recollection of letters, processors are unaware that they 
have seen the letters, and perceive that they will be unable to recall them. This 
supports the hypothesis then, that iconic memory tasks might have face validity in the 
assessment of malingering. Research findings regarding the impact of severe mental 
illness on iconic memory is sparse, but since recalling items from the icon store does 
not require cognitive effort or direction, patients with mental illness might 
conceivably be successful on iconic memory tasks.
The iconic memory and pop-out paradigms allow for the calculation and computation 
of different error types such as “misses” (omissions) and false positives 
(commissions) which have been shown to be indicative of malingering-style in 
previous literature (e.g. Boone et al, 2000; Boone et al, 2002).
OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESENT STUDY
The primary purpose of the present study was to preliminarily evaluate the predictive 
validity and clinical usefulness of a multi-modal (performance and interview-based) 
battery in the assessment of malingered cognitive symptoms in severe mental illness. 
Simulating malingerers of mental illness were expected to perform worse than true
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patients on cognitive tests based on the pop-out and iconic memory paradigms, as 
tasks were anticipated to have face validity and to measure (preattentive) skills that 
are relatively preserved in severe mental illness, in comparison with more effortful 
cognitive processing. The test battery also incorporated the Cognitive Dysfunctions 
Questionnaire (CDQ), an interview-based measure of malingered cognitive symptoms 
developed (by Adrian Coxell) prior to this study. Again, simulating malingerers were 
expected to endorse a higher rate of malingered symptomatology on this task than true 
patients or healthy controls. The Rey Memory Test (with recognition component) and 
the M-FAST were also administered in order that simulated malingering could be 
externally validated, and also so that malingered profiles on the cognitive test battery 




A 3-group simulation design was employed, comprising a psychiatric patient group, a 
healthy control group, and a psychiatric malingering group. The test battery was 
administered to 105 male participants in total, of which 35 were healthy controls, 35 
were simulating malingerers, and 35 were psychiatric inpatients with a diagnosis of 
severe mental illness.11 Procedures for participant recruitment and inclusion and 
exclusion criteria for each group are described below.
Simulating Malingerer and Healthy Control Groups
Of the 70 healthy controls recruited through opportunity sampling, 35 were randomly 
assigned to the malingering group, and 35 to the healthy control group. Inclusion and 
exclusion criteria for these two groups were identical, and potential participants were 
asked not to take part if they:
1. Were not native English speakers
2. Had a history of severe mental illness (e.g. schizophrenia, bipolar disorder)
3. Had a learning disability
4. Had a history of dyslexia or other reading difficulty
5. Had ever sustained a serious head injury (more than 10 minutes unconscious)
6. Had a history of neurological disease (e.g. epilepsy)
7. Had a visual impairment that was not corrected by glasses or contact lenses
1 These group sizes were chosen on the basis that large effect sizes were expected, as demonstrated in
the bulk of previous malingering research.
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True Patient Group
35 psychiatric inpatients formed the true patient group. Patients were asked not to 
participate if they:
1. Were not native English speakers
2. Did not have a diagnosis of severe mental illness (e.g. schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder)
3. Had a learning disability
4. Had a history of dyslexia or other reading difficulty
5. Had ever sustained a serious head injury (more than 10 minutes unconscious)
6. Had a history of neurological disease (e.g. epilepsy)
7. Had a visual impairment that was not corrected by glasses or contact lenses




Following the receipt of appropriate ethical approval (see Appendix 1) potential 
participants for the healthy control group were approached and given an information 
sheet about the study (Appendix 2). This informed them of the exclusion criteria for 
the study, the anonymity of their participation, and of their right to decline 
participation or to withdraw at any time, including after having given consent. They 
were informed that participation entailed the completion of a test battery comprising a 
variety of short tasks (pen-and paper and computer administered), and a number of 
questions about psychiatric symptoms, and that this would take about 60 minutes. 
Arrangements were made with participants who consented, to meet with them at a
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convenient time to administer the test battery. The appropriate consent forms were 
completed and signed before participation commenced (Appendix 3).
Simulating Malingering Group
Following the receipt of appropriate ethical approval (see Appendix 1) potential 
participants for the malingering group were approached and given an information 
sheet about the study (Appendix 4). This information sheet was identical to that given 
to the healthy control group, except that it contained an additional clause as follows:
“About 15 minutes into these tasks you will be instructed to answer the 
questions in a particular way. You will not be told the details o f this yet, as 
it is important that you answer questions at the beginning without being 
aware o f the instructions that you will be given later”.
This was in order to be transparent with potential participants that they would be asked 
to “do something” over and above their normal performance during participation, and to 
thus ensure that they were providing informed consent. Elaboration of this clause was 
provided for any potential participants who asked questions. The author explained that 
participants would be asked to role-play a particular scenario, but that this would not 
involve them having to do anything that they might find aversive or embarrassing. As 
above, arrangements were made with participants who consented, to meet with them 
at a convenient time to administer the test battery. The appropriate consent forms 
were completed and signed before participation commenced (Appendix 3).
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True Patient Group
Following the receipt of appropriate ethical approval (see Appendix 5), consultant 
psychiatrists were sent details of the study proposal and asked to provide the names of 
any male inpatients that might/might not be suitable to take part in the study. A 
stipulation within the ethical approval application had been that consultant 
psychiatrists would give consent for patients to be approached prior to the researcher 
approaching them. Only patients deemed suitable (or not unsuitable) and ‘well 
enough’ by their consultant psychiatrist were approached by the researcher and 
invited to take part.
Patients who were approached were given an information sheet about the study 
(Appendix 6). This informed the potential participant of the anonymity of their 
participation, and of what participation would entail. It also stated that the study, their 
decision to participate and their performance, was not related and would not relate to 
their treatment on the ward, and that their scores or answers would not be shown to 
their consultant or to other staff members. Arrangements were made with patients 
who agreed to take part to administer the test battery in a private room on the ward, 
and appropriate consent forms were completed before participation commenced 
(Appendix 7). A copy of the patient consent form was placed with the patient’s 
medical notes according to policy.
Prior to being recruited no participants were informed that the study was about 
malingering, lest this influence their responding in any way. They were informed that 
the study was about “different symptoms people with and without mental illnesses 
might experience”. On completion a debriefing was offered to participants who 
wanted to know more about the study, or to ask any questions.
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INSTRUMENTS/ TEST BATTERY
For the purposes of explication, the test battery is divided into two sections, Section A 
and Section B. This is an artificial separation for the purpose of describing the 
rationale behind experimental design and methodology employed, and does not relate 
to the way in which the battery was presented to participants. Section A, which was 
administered first, comprises tests that provide information about the true ability and 
true pathology of all participants (assuming honest and effortful responding). 
Section A then, was administered to the malingering group prior to their being 
instructed to malinger.
Section B comprises tests of malingered symptom reporting and test performance in 
the malingering group, and tests of true symptom reporting and test performance in 
the true patient and healthy control group. This arrangement of the test battery, and 
its inclusion of true and malingered ability scores for the malingering group, and 
measures of true cognitive and psychiatric status of the true patient group, adds 
weight to the meaning that can be drawn from results obtained. Any confound of true 
cognitive and psychiatric symptomatology on the tests of malingering can be directly 
measured, as can the performance modification of malingerers according to 
malingering instruction.
TESTS OF TRUE ABILITY AND PATHOLOGY: Section A
Section A comprises the four tests that are outlined below. These were administered 
in the order in which they are presented.2
2 Order of test administration was identical for all participants since rotation of order would have 
created problems in interpreting the nature of malingered responses.
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(1) The Weschler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR)
The WTAR (Weschler, 2001) comprises a list of 50 words which the participant is 
asked to pronounce out loud to the best of their ability. The WTAR is a test of 
premorbid IQ, which can be completed in approximately 2 minutes. Participants’ 
correct scores out of 50 were computed, providing a rudimentary (raw score) measure 
of IQ. This would be used to investigate correlations with performance on indices of 
malingering.
(2) The Camden Pictorial Recognition Memory Test (CPRMT)
The CPRMT (Warrington, 1988) is a forced-choice recognition memory test for 
pictorial material. Responders are shown 30 photographs at a rate of three seconds 
per photograph. They are then asked to identify each one when it is presented in a 
field with 2 distractors in the recognition phase of the task. This test has been 
demonstrated to be easy for various standardisation samples including persons with 
significant brain injury. A score out of 30 is computed, based on the number of 
photographs that are correctly identified.
(3) Simple Reaction Time Task
A computer-administered test of reaction time was devised and programmed by 
Adrian Coxell. Participants were required to press (and release) the “enter” button on 
the keypad as quickly as they could after seeing a uniform stimuli (XXXX) appear on 
the screen. On pressing the button the screen would go blank, until the next stimulus 
was generated initiating the individual’s next response. This task comprised 30 trials 
(following 2 sample items), and ended when the screen remained blank. The 
computer generated a single score of the mean reaction time (the time between the
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stimulus appearing, and the participant reacting to it by pressing and releasing the 
enter button) for each participant.
(4) Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI)
The BSI (Derogatis, 1993) is a 53-item self-report symptom inventory designed to 
reflect the psychological symptom patterns of psychiatric and medical patients as well 
as community non-patient responders. Each item on the BSI is rated on a 5-point 
scale of distress (0-4) ranging from “not at all”(0) to “extremely” (4). Instructions ask 
the participant to rate how much (if at all), they were distressed by each item over the 
last 7 days. Three global indices of psychiatric symptomatology (Global Symptom 
Index, Positive Symptoms Total, Positive Symptoms Distress Index) were scored for 
each participant according to the BSI manual.
Malingering Instructions
Following the administration of Section A of the test battery, participants in the 
malingering group were given the following instructions:
“As stated in the information sheet that you read before your participation began, I 
am now going to ask you to answer all o f the remainder o f the questions, and to 
perform on all subsequent tests in a particular way. I want you to respond to all 
subsequent tasks in a way that you believe that a person with a SERIOUS MENTAL 
ILLNESS would do so. You should try to portray having a serious mental illness in as 
realistic and convincing a manner as you can. Imagine that you are in a legal 
predicament (i.e. you have committed a serious offence) and you believe it is in your 
best interests to appear to be seriously mentally ill, and therefore “less responsible ” 
or “not responsible ” for what you have done. Perhaps for example, you want to 
appear to be “unfit to plead” at a criminal trial. I  want you to answer all subsequent
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questions about symptoms, and to perform all subsequent tasks in this role. The rest 
o f this procedure should take approximately 25 minutes. I  will be performing these 
tests on approximately 30 other people. The person whose scores on these tests best 
approximate those o f true patients with serious mental illness, will be given a “prize” 
o f £50. It is therefore in your interests to answer in as realistic and convincing a 
manner as possible. I will also take your details (which I will store in a confidential 
manner) for this purpose. I  will not give you any further information at this stage 
about “serious mental illness”, as I am interested in your perception o f this, in regard 
to the answering o f subsequent questions. ”
TESTS OF MALINGERED AND TRUE ABILITY AND 
PATHOLOGY: Section B
After the completion of tests comprising Section A and the administration of the 
above instructions to the malingering group, the following tests were completed by all 
participants, in the order in which they are described below.
(5) Cognitive Dysfunctions Questionnaire (CDQ)
The CDQ is a questionnaire developed prior to this study by Adrian Coxell. It was 
developed through researching exceedingly rare cognitive symptoms associated with 
neurological and psychiatric complaints. The CDQ comprises 69 items (Appendix 8), 
including exceedingly rare symptoms (n=7), and nonexistent (i.e. malingered) 
symptoms (n=22). The remaining items are neutral items intended to furnish the 
CDQ with face validity as a test of malingering. The opening statement of the CDQ 
(See Appendix 8) introduces the idea that mental illnesses are sometimes associated 
with unusual and distressing experiences, which is intended to suggest the possibility
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of some of the “malingered” items. The CDQ is administered in the form of an 
interview and participants are asked to respond “yes”, “no”, or “not sure” according to 
whether they have experienced each of the 69 “unusual experiences” during the three 
months prior to testing. After the participant has been asked about each of the 69 
items, they are asked to rate the frequency and level of distress associated with each 
endorsed item, including those to which they have answered “not sure”. Response 
options range from (1) “once only”, through (6) “all of the time” for frequency 
ratings, and from (1) “not at all”, through (5) “severely distressing” for level of 
distress ratings.
Four scores were derived using the malingered and rare symptoms items only (n=29) 
for each participant as follows:
(i) Total rare and malingered symptoms score (Participants scored (2) for
definite affirmative responses, and (1) for “not sure”) (Range - 29 x 2 =58)
(ii) Total rating of frequency of occurrence of malingered and rare symptoms
(Range - 29 x 6 = 174)
(iii) Total rating of distress caused by symptoms (Range - 29 x 5 = 145)
(iv) CDQ total score based on formula below
Symptoms reported score X (Total frequency X Total distress)
Scores derived from the above formula were divided by 1000 and then rounded to 
obtain a final CDQ TOTAL SCORE.
A multiplicative formula was used here, in order that the total CDQ scores of 
malingerers, who might not only endorse nonexistent symptoms but might also 
endorse high frequency and high associated distress levels, would be amplified
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commensurately with this “triple” exaggeration/feigning. This formula then, 
potentiates maximal discrimination between simulating malingerers and the other two 
groups, if as hypothesised they malinger on each component index of the total CDQ 
score.
(6) Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST)
The M-FAST (Miller, 2000) is a 25-item forced choice structured interview designed 
to screen for malingered psychiatric illness. Administration takes approximately 10 
minutes, and responders are asked about whether they experience particular 
‘symptoms’ that true psychiatric patients are known not to endorse. A total score is 
computed for each participant indicating how many ‘malingered’ items they endorsed. 
A cut-off score of 6 or above is highly indicative of malingering in clinical settings 
(Miller, 2001). Presenting this ‘gold standard’ malingering instrument to all 
participants validated the malingering status of the simulating group, and the honest- 
responding status of the true patient and healthy control groups.
(7) Iconic Memory Task
A computer-administered task based on the iconic memory paradigm (Sperling, 1960) 
was devised and programmed by Adrian Coxell.3 Following several sample items, 20 
trials of 8 letters (2 rows of 4) were presented on the computer for duration of 1.5 
seconds each. As the letters disappeared the researcher pronounced the command 
either “top” or “bottom”, and participants named as many letters (if any), that they 
could remember from the row corresponding to the command. This was not a timed 
task, and each new set of letters was generated through the keypad by the researcher,
3 This task was based on the iconic memory paradigm and was not intended to measure true iconic 
memory. The task was modified (i.e. decreasing exposure times) in order to provide face validity as a 
malingering task.
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following an individual’s answers to the previous item. The task was presented to 
participants as a “task of memory and attention” and the researcher stressed the 
brevity of the duration for which letters would appear on the screen (in order to 
reinforce the expected perception that the task was very difficult). (See Appendix 9 
for verbatim instructions read to each participant).
Following the initial 20 trials at 1.5 seconds duration, a further 20 trials were 
presented at 0.75 seconds duration each, followed by a further 20 trials at 0.375 
seconds duration each. Each change in duration was preceded by a break in the 
procedure for a couple of seconds and participants were reminded that presentation 
would now “get faster”. Again this was intended to enhance the (inaccurate) 
perception of increasing task difficulty. The researcher recorded participants’ exact 
responses to each of the 60 (20x3) trials. Responses were then marked, and the 
number of correct responses (0-80) and false positive responses (0-80) for each 
duration period were recorded for each participant.
(8) Pop-out Task
Computer-administered tasks based on the pop-out paradigm (Treisman & Souther, 
1985) were devised and programmed by Adrian Coxell (See Appendix 10 for 
verbatim instructions read to each participant). These consisted of 2 distinct tasks, 
with 2 conditions in each as follows:
Task A -  Determination of presence or absence of a full circle target 
Participants were required to specify for each of 60 trials, consisting of patterns of 
randomly computer-generated circles, whether the circles were “all the same” or “one 
different”. The computer had been programmed to randomly generate patterns of
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circles, some of which were all closed and fully round (“all the same”), and some of 
which had one circle that was not fully complete, but the same size as the others, 
resembling a capital letter ‘C \ If present the location of the “different” circle in the 
field of distractors was randomly varied, and equal amounts of trials in each condition 
were presented. Half of the trials in each condition consisted of 12 stimuli in total, 
and the other half of 18 stimuli in total. Participants were instructed to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible, and were informed that each response would 
initiate the next trial. In this way they could not go back to a trial, and were instructed 
to move on if they made a mistake.
Participants responded by pressing the ‘1’ button on the keypad if, on scanning the 
trial, they thought that the circles were “all the same”, and the ‘+/=’ button if they saw 
“one different”. The buttons were labelled with coloured stickers marked ‘S’ (same) 
and ‘D’ (different) respectively, and sample trials were administered for each 
condition prior to commencing. The computer generated error scores for each of the 
following conditions for each participant:
i. Errors (out of 20) when target was present with 11 distractors
ii. Errors (out of 20) when target was present with 17 distractors
iii. Errors (out of 20) when target was absent (12 stimuli)
iv. Errors (out of 20) when target was absent (18 stimuli)
(i) and (ii) are errors of an omission type (denying the stimulus) and (iii) and (iv) are 
errors of a commission type (false positive error). The computer also generated mean 
correct response latency times for each condition.4
4 Due to a computer error response latencies were not recorded as expected. Repeated measures 
analyses to test for hypothesised slowing of responses with increased distractors in the malingering 
group could therefore not be performed. Error scores for the 12 and 18 stimuli presentations are 
conflated into a single score in the results section.
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Task B -  Determination of presence or absence of incomplete circle target
The format of the above task was repeated but this time with the features of the 
stimuli reversed. In the “all the same” condition this time, all of the circles were 
incomplete and resembled the capital ‘C’ described above. In the “one different” 
condition on this occasion, participants would see a complete round circle in a field of 
‘Cs’. Demonstrations of each condition were given prior to commencement. The 
computer generated error scores for the following conditions:
v. Errors (out of 20) when target was present with 11 distractors
vi. Errors (out of 20) when target was present with 17 distractors
vii. Errors (out of 20) when target was absent (12 stimuli)
viii. Errors (out of 20) when target was absent (18 stimuli)
(v) and (vi) are errors of an omission type (denying the stimulus) and (vii) and (viii) 
are errors of a commission type (false positive error). The computer also generated 
mean correct response latency times for each condition.
9 The Rey Memory Test
The Rey 15-item memory test (Lezak, 1995) was administered along with the 
recognition component developed by Boone, Salazar, Lu, Wamer-Chacon and Razani 
(2002). Participants are shown a piece of paper with 15 over-learned stimuli (123, 
abc etc.) on it and instructed to leam and remember as many symbols as they can 
during a 10-second exposure. Instructions are intended to emphasise the apparently 
large amount of items to be learned in a short time-period, but in fact this is a very 
easy test. The stimulus is then removed, and they are asked to write down as many of 
the 15 items that they can remember. Following this part of the task participants are 
given a sheet of paper with 30 stimuli on it, and are asked to circle as many of the 15
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items that they had previously been shown as they can remember. Each participant’s 
recall, recognition, and combination score5 was recorded.
Following the administration of the test battery, participants were thanked for their 
participation and any questions they had were answered. Each participant’s age, 
ethnicity and test scores were entered into a database created in SPSS. All raw data, 
consent forms and electronic data were kept in accordance with stipulated ethics, and 
data protection protocols.
5 This combination score is derived from the following formula: Combination Score = Recall correct + 




In Part I of the results section I will present the results and group differences for the 
demographic characteristics, measures of true ability and pathology, and the measures 
comprising the Malingered Cognitive Symptoms Test Battery (MCSTB) for the three 
participant groups. Differences in group means were examined using ANOVA. If the 
homogeneity of variance assumption was violated (significant Levene’s test finding), 
group differences were examined using the Kruskal-Wallis procedure. Where 
ANOVA was appropriate, the significance levels for post-hoc tests were based on the 
Bonferroni test. Where ANOVA was inappropriate, Dunnett’s C test (which does not 
assume homogeneity of variance) was applied after first checking for a significant 
overall effect using the Kruskal-Wallis test.
In Part II of the results section, scores on the measures comprising the MCSTB (n=6) 
were converted into stanine scores from which a single composite (mean stanine) 
score was derived for each participant. A Receiver Operator Characteristics (ROC) 
curve analysis was performed on the composite scores of the true patients and 
simulating malingerers, in order to examine the power of this index in discriminating 
between the two groups. This ROC curve analysis of composite scores was compared 
with that of true patients’ and malingerers’ scores on the M-FAST and on the RMT, 
since these are established tests of malingering. Optimal cut-off scores for the 
MCSTB are presented and classifications of true patients and malingerers on the 
basis of this instrument are presented and compared with known group status. 
Classifications based on the composite scores are compared with classifications based 
on the M-FAST and RMT scores for the two groups.
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The confound between true pathology and ability and malingering indices used in this 
study, is explored in Part III of the results section. Correlations between educational 
level, true ability and true pathology, and composite (and component) MCSTB scores 
are presented for the true patient group. Correlations between the M-FAST scores 




The demographic characteristics of the true patient, healthy control and simulating 
malingerer groups are presented in Table 1. Data are presented either as the mean 
(with the standard deviation in parentheses), or as the number of participants (with the 
percentage of group total in parentheses). For the education variable, participants 
were scored according to their highest reported level of educational attainment (less 
than O’Levels (1), O’Levels (2), A’Levels (3), degree Level (4)). Education was 
treated as a continuous variable, and means and standard deviations derived.
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the Healthy Control. True Patient and 
Simulating Malingerer Groups
Variable Healthy Controls True Patients Simulating
Malingerers
Age 34.29(12.56) 39.89(11.06) 34.06(8.10)
Education 3.31 (1.02) 2.06(1.06) 3.6(0.70)
Employment
Manual 8(22.9%) 23 (65.7%) 6(17.1%)
Professional 27(77.1%) 6(17.1%) 29(82.9%)
Never Employed 0 6(17.1%) 0
Ethnic Status
White 32(91.4%) 18(51.4%) 31(88.6%)
Non-white 3(8.6%) 17(48.6%) 4(11.4% )
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An overall significant difference in age was found across the three groups (F2,i02 = 
3.31, p < 0.05). However, post-hoc analyses did not reveal any significant difference 
in age between any group pair.
An overall significant difference in education was found across the three groups ( F 2, io2 
= 26.78, p <0.01). The Levene test found however that the homogeneity of variance 
of educational attainment scores differed significantly between groups. Therefore 
group differences were also assessed using a non-parametric test. The Kruskal-Wallis 
test found a highly significant difference between the three groups (x2(2)=35.10,
p=<0.01).
Post hoc test of group differences found that educational attainment was significantly 
lower in the patient group than in the healthy control group (p<0.01), and the 
malingering group (p <0.01).
There was a significant association between group membership and previous 
employment type Qc2(2) = 44.97, p=<0.001).
There was a significant association between group membership and ethnic 
background (white/non-white) (%2(2) = 19.8, p=<0.01).
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ASSESSMENT OF TRUE ABILITY
Scores and group differences on tests of true ability are summarised in Table 2.




















TP < HC*; 
TP < SM**; 
HC < SM *
CPMT 29.5 27.6 28.7 p2,102= TP < HC**
(0.9) (2.7) (3.4) 4.96
**
RT 0.3 0.59 0.3 X2(2) = TP > HC**;
(0.06) (0.4) (0.06) 26.78,
**
TP > SM**
*p < 0.01; ** p < 0.001
WTAR raw scores differed significantly between groups. Post-hoc analyses found 
that scores on the WTAR were significantly lower in the patient group than in the 
healthy control (p<0.01) and the malingering group (p<0.001). Healthy controls also 
had significantly lower WTAR scores than the simulating malingering group
(p<0.01).
Reaction Time scores differed significantly between groups. As predicted, a priori 
tests found that true patients had significantly slower reaction times than healthy 
controls (p<0.001) and simulating malingerers (p<0.001). Reaction Time and WTAR 
scores were significantly negatively correlated (r = - 0.199, p = <0.05).
82
Scores on the Camden Pictorial Memory Test differed significantly between groups. 
Post-hoc analyses found that scores for the patient group were significantly lower than 
those for the healthy control group (p<0.001). Mean CPMT scores were comparable 
with those of patients1 (TBI) and healthy controls provided in the test manual.
ASSESSMENT OF TRUE PATHOLOGY 
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) Scores
Mean (SD) scores for the Global Severity Index (GSI), the Positive Symptoms Total 
(PST) and the Positive Symptom Distress Index (PSDI) of the BSI are presented in 
Table 3. Group differences in index scores were analysed using ANOVA. However 
the Levene statistic was significant in each case, so the Kruskal-Wallis test was also 
performed.
Table 3: Group means (SDs) and significance levels for the BSI primary symptom



















































TP > HC***; 
TP > SM***
**p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
1 Our sample -  27.6 (27), CPMT Manual norms 28.1 (2.7), and 29.1 (1.3)
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As predicted, a priori tests found significantly greater scores on each global index 
score for the true patient group than for the healthy control and the malingering 
groups. No significant group differences were found between the healthy controls and 
the malingerers on any of the three global index scores.
Mean and standard deviation scores for the 3 global indices in the true patient group 
were comparable with male adult psychiatric inpatient normative data provided in the 
BSI test manual. PST3 and GSI4 scores were marginally higher in the present sample, 
and PSDI5 marginally lower than those in the normative sample (n=158).
Mean and standard deviation scores for the 3 global indices in the non-patient groups 
were also comparative to those comprising the normative (male non-patient) data in 
the BSI manual. In the present sample marginally higher GSI and PST scores, and 
marginally lower PSDI scores were found, compared with the normative sample (n= 
361).
ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERED SYMPTOMATOLOGY
(1) Cognitive Dysfunctions Questionnaire (CDQ) Scores
4 CDQ indices based on rare (n=7) and ‘malingered’ (n=22) items endorsed, reported 
frequency of occurrence, reported associated distress and total CDQ score (see Table 
4 for formula), were calculated for each participant. Group differences were 
examined using ANOVA followed by Kruskal-Wallis tests, since scores were not
3 Present sample 25.34 (13.89), BSI Manual 24.44 (14.20)
4 Present sample 1.12 (0.78), BSI Manual 0.97 (0.78)
5 Present sample 1.04 (0.72), BSI Manual 1.86 (0.74)
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homogenous in variance across the three groups in the case of each index. Mean (SD) 
scores are summarised in Table 4.

















































































*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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As predicted a priori tests found that simulating malingerers endorsed significantly 
more rare and ‘malingered’ symptoms than patients and healthy controls. As also 
predicted, malingerers reported significantly higher frequencies of endorsed 
symptoms, and significantly greater associated distress.
Contrary to prediction, a priori tests found that true patients endorsed significantly 
more rare and malingered symptoms, and also reported higher frequencies and 
associated distress, than healthy controls. Total CDQ scores however, did not differ 
significantly between the two groups.
(2) Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms (M-FAST) Scores
A summary of mean (SD) M-FAST scores and group differences is presented in Table 
5. ANOVA found a significant overall group difference in M-FAST scores. The 
Levene test however was significant so a Kruskal -W allis test was also performed.
As predicted, a priori tests of group differences found that malingerers had 
significantly higher M-FAST scores than true patients (pcO.OOl) and healthy controls 
(p<0.001). Further, as predicted, true patients had significantly higher scores than 
healthy controls (p<0.001).
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Table 5: Means (SDs) and group differences in M-FAST scores for true patients.


















SM > TP***; 
SM > HC***; 
TP > HC***
* * * p <  0.001, * * p <  0.01
Mean (SD) M-FAST scores for the malingering group in the present sample were 
lower than the normative scores provided in the M-FAST manual for simulating 
malingerers (16.0 (0.81)). Mean (SD) M-FAST scores for the present true patient 
sample were comparable to those provided in the M-FAST manual, which ranged 
from 0.81 (1.12) to 2.60 (1.43) across various validation studies.
(3) Iconic Memory Task Scores
A between (group) and one within (display exposure time) ANOVA analysis was 
conducted on scores for the number of items correctly recalled, and for the number of 
false positive letters errors made by participants.
Items correctly recalled
Figure 1 shows the mean iconic memory items correctly recalled by each participant 
group across the 3 exposure times. There was a significant main effect of group (F2iI02 
= 15.8, p<0.001) and of display exposure time (F2.2o4 = 123.7, p<0.001). The 
interaction between group and display exposure time was also significant (F2,i02 = 
7.94, p <0.001).
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Planned comparisons found a significant difference between recall scores for the 
1500msec display time and the 375msec display time condition (p<0.001), but a non­
significant difference between the 750 and 375msec display time condition. Post-hoc 
tests found that recall scores for the healthy controls differed significantly to those of 
true patients (p<0.001), and also to those of malingerers (p <0.001). There were no 
other significant differences.











Figure 2 shows the mean iconic memory false positive scores across the 3 exposure 
times for patients, healthy controls and simulating malingerers. There was a 
significant main effect of group (F2i102 = 4.9, p < 0.01). The effect of display exposure
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time was marginally significant (F2,204 = 2.9, p< 0.06). The interaction between groups 
and display exposure time was also marginally significant (F2,i02 = 2.2, p<0.08).
Planned comparisons found a significant difference between recall scores for the 
1500msec display time and the 375msec display time condition (p< 0.005), and a non­
significant difference between the 750 and 375msec display time condition (p = 
0.015). Post-hoc analyses revealed a significant difference between false positive 
scores for malingerers and true patients (p = 0.02), and between malingerers and 
healthy controls (p<0.005). Differences between healthy control and true patient 
scores were not significant.















(4) Pop-out Task Scores
Analysis before the use of multivariate statistical testing revealed that error scores on 
the pop-out tasks were not suitable for multivariate testing even after data 
transformation (square root, log,0). Therefore it was decided to analyse the data with 
respect to omission ( ‘misses’) and commission ( ‘false positives’) errors for each of
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the Treisman tasks (pop-out and non-popout). 4Error scores for the 12 and 18 
distractor conditions were added together for each condition, to derive a single score.
Table 6 shows a summary of the data from nonparametric analyses of two types of 
error scores for each group across the 2 (pop-out/non-pop-out) tasks. In all conditions 
mean scores for the malingerers are significantly greater than for healthy controls 
(p<0.001) or true patients (pcO.OOl).
Table 6: Means (SD) and group differences for omission and commission error scores
in each DOD-out and non-DOpout task condition






Pop-out 2.8 5.8 13.9 X2(2) = SM > 
HC***;




p jQ * * *
Pop-out
SM >
Commissions 0.3 1.4 11.3 X\2) = HC***;
SM >
(0.6) (2.3) (8.8) 56.6 *** Y P * * * .
TP > HC**
Non-popout 4.4 6.6 15.3 %2(2) = SM
> H c * * * ;
Omissions (4.1) (5.4) (7.0) 41.4 SM >
4 Due to a computer error response latencies (intended to explore any differences between malingered 
and true patient response time ratios between 12 and 18 stimuli conditions), were not recorded. 
Therefore there was no merit in distinguishing between these two conditions, and error rates on each 












*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
As can be seen in Table 6, group means for omission error are greater than group 
means for commission errors. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks procedure found that the 
difference between total omission and total commission error scores was highly 
significant (z = -6.884, p=<0.001).
(5) Rey Memory Test (RMT) Scores
Mean scores for the recall and recognition memory tasks for the three groups are 
presented in Figure 3.
Recall Scores
Significant group differences in recall scores were found using ANOVA (F2,i02 = 
14.74, p<0.001). The Levene statistic was significant so a Kruskal-Wallis test was 
also performed (%2(2) =30.516, p=<0.001). As predicted a priori tests (unequal 
variances assumed) found that healthy controls recalled significantly more items than
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true patients (p<0.001) and simulating malingerers (pcO.OOl). Contrary to prediction 
a priori tests found no significant differences between the amount of items recalled by 
true patients and simulating malingerers.
Recognition Scores
Significant group differences in recognition scores were found using ANOVA (F2,i0 2 = 
18.9, pcO.OOl). The Levene statistic was significant so a Kruskal-Wallis test was also 
performed (x2(2) =37.305, p=<0.001). As predicted a priori tests (unequal variances 
assumed) found that healthy controls correctly recognised significantly more items 
than simulating malingerers (p<0.001). A priori tests also found that healthy controls 
recognised significantly more symbols than true patients (pcO.OOl). Contrary to 
prediction a priori tests found no significant differences between the amount of items 
recognised by true patients and simulating malingerers.
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True Patient Healthy Control Malingerer 
type of memory task
False Positive Scores
Mean false positives errors on the recognition task of the RMT are shown in figure 4. 
False positive scores were found to differ significantly between groups using the 
Kruskal-Wallis procedure (x 2, 2d.f = 27.3, p= < 0.001). As predicted, a priori tests 
(unequal variances assumed) found that simulating malingerers committed 
significantly more false positive errors than did the true patients (p=0.001) and 
healthy controls (p<0.001). True patients committed significantly more false positive 
errors than healthy controls (p=0.02).
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Figure 4 : Mean False Positives for Rev Memory Test (Recognition)
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Mean Combination scores for the RMT for the three groups are presented in Figure 5. 
An overall significant difference in Rey Combination scores was found between 
groups (F2. 102 = 25.62, p = <0.001). Homogeneity of variance differed significantly 
between groups so a Kruskal-Wallis test was performed and found to be highly 
significant (x2(2)= 46.46, p = < 0.001). As predicted, a priori tests of group 
differences (unequal variances assumed) found that healthy controls scored 
significantly higher than true patients (p<0.001), and than malingerers (p< 0.001). 
Contrary to prediction, differences in scores between true patients and simulating 
malingerers were not significant (p=0.08).
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RESULTS SECTION (PART II)
In Part II of the results section stanine scores for each component of the MCSTB 
(n=6) are combined and averaged (mean) in order to generate a single composite 
score. Receiver Operator Characteristics (ROC) Curve analyses are performed on
true patient and simulating malingerer composite scores, in order to generate cut-off
scores that maximise specificity and sensitivity of malingering classifications. ROC 
curve analyses are also performed on true patient and malingerer scores on the 
established tests of malingering namely the M-FAST and the RMT. Classifications of 
true patients and malingerers in this sample on the basis of the composite MCSTB 
scores is presented and compared with classifications according to the M-FAST 
(using recommended cut-off) scores.
The following scores for each participant were used in generating composite MCSTB 
scores:
• Treisman total omission error score
• Treisman total commission error score
• Iconic memory total items recalled score
• Iconic memory total false positive score
• Rey Combination score
• CDQ total score
Scores obtained on each of these variables were transformed into stanine scores such 
that the higher the stanine score, the worse the test performance / more symptom and 
symptom frequency / distress caused by the symptom reporting. Stanine scores were 
generated using established criteria by converting individual raw scores (on each
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variable) into percentiles and then allocating a stanine score (range 1-9) depending on 
where in the percentile range individual scores are located as follows:
Percentile Range Stanine Score
0 - 4 1
5 -1 1 2
1 2 -2 3 3
2 4 -4 0 4
4 1 -6 0 5
6 1 -7 7 6
7 8 -8 9 7
9 0 -9 6 8
9 7 -1 0 0 9
Stanine scores for each participant on each index comprising the MCSTB then, were 
added together and divided by 6 (the number of variables) and rounded. A composite 
stanine score was thus generated for each participant.
Composite Scores for MCSTB
Table 7 summarises the mean (standard deviation) composite scores for the three 
groups. The MCSTB composite scores differed significantly between the groups 
(F2.102 = 59.39, p< 0.001). The Levene statistic was also significant so a Kruskal- 
Wallis test was also conducted (%2(2) = 61.18, p = <0.001).
Planned comparisons (unequal variances assumed) revealed composite scores were 
significantly greater for malingerers than for true patients (p < 0.001) and healthy 
controls (p < 0.001). The true patient composite scores were significantly greater than 
those of the healthy controls (p < 0.001).
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MCSTB 4.2 4.94 6.14 X2(2) = SM >
Composite HC***;
Scores (0.58) (0.59) (1.0) 61.18 SM >
TP***-
*** TP >
* * * P  < 0.001
ROC CURVE ANALYSES 
M-FAST Scores
The ROC curve analysis for the M-FAST scores of the true patient and simulating 
malingering groups is shown in Figure 6. The area under the curve statistic (AUC) 
was 0.923 (95% Cl: 0.854-0.993, p= <0.001). The AUC statistic represents the 
probability that the M-FAST score for a randomly chosen malingerer will exceed the 
M-FAST score for a randomly chosen true patient. At the cut-off score of 6 a 
sensitivity of 0.829, and a specificity of 0.914 were achieved for this sample. These 
rates were comparable to the sensitivity and specificity rates provided in the M-FAST 
manual (0.84 and 0.94 respectively).
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RMT Recall and Combination Scores
Table 8 shows the results of the ROC curve analyses of true patient and healthy 
control scores for the Rey Memory Test (recall and Combination scores). Sensitivity 
and specificity rates are according to the published cut-offs for these scores, which are 
<9 for the recall score, and < 20 for the combination score.
The AUC statistics for the ROC curve analysis for Rey Recall and Rey Combination 
scores are not significant. This indicates that the probability that a Rey Recall or Rey 
Combination score for a randomly true patient would exceed that of a randomly 
chosen simulating malingerer, is not significant. These scores do not discriminate 
between the two groups in this sample.
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Table 8: Summary of ROC curve analyses for true patient and healthy control RMT
scores
RMT Score AUC Cl 95% Sig. Sensitivity Specificity









The ROC curve analysis of the composite MCSTB scores for the true patient and 
simulating malingerer groups is presented in figure 7. The AUC statistic was 0.829 
(95% Cl: 0.731-0.926, p = 0.001), indicating that the composite MCSTB scores 
discriminate between true patients and malingerers in this sample with a high degree 
of precision. The ROC curve analysis revealed that the optimum stanine cut-off score 
was 6 (sensitivity = 0.714, specificity =0.857).
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A ROC curve analysis was also performed on mean stanine scores of the 4 indices 
which showed significant discriminatory power between malingerers and true 
patients. Iconic memory total recall and RMT combination scores were removed 
from the original MCSTB computation since they did not discriminate between the 
two groups in this sample. This analysis is presented in Figure 8. The AUC statistic 
for the ‘reduced’ MCSTB score based on 4 indices was 0.855 (Cl 95%: 0.763 -  
0.947). This analysis revealed that the optimum cut-off score for maximising 
sensitivity and specificity was 6 (sensitivity 0.829, specificity 0.829). These results 
illustrate an increase in the ROC curve AUC statistic with the use of the ‘reduced’ 
MCSTB compared with the full battery, resulting in a higher rate of sensitivity 
(positive identification of true malingerers), but also a lower rate of specificity (i.e. 
increased false classification of true patients).
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CLASSIFICATION OF MALINGERING AND TRUE MENTAL 
ILLNESS
One individual in the healthy control group was classified as malingering on the 
MCSTB. Apart from this case all healthy controls were classified as not malingering 
on the M-FAST and the MCSTB. Data for the healthy control group are not included 
in this section of the results.
Table 9 summarises the classifications (not malingering/ malingering) of the true 
patient and malingering participants according to the various instruments (scores) 
administered.
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Table 9: Numbers of true patients and malingerers correctly and incorrectly classified














M-FAST 32 29 3 6
MCSTB 31 25 4 10
‘Reduced’ MCSTB 29 29 6 6
Table 9 illustrates the (near) equivalence of the M-FAST and the MCSTB (6 indices) 
in specificity (low false positive rate). The MCSTB however, has less sensitivity than 
the M-FAST, making 4 fewer true positive malingering classifications than the M- 
FAST in this sample. It also has lower sensitivity making 1 more (true patient) false 
positive classification than the M-FAST for this sample. Classification on the basis 
of the ‘reduced’ MCSTB achieves a sensitivity equal to that of the M-FAST in this 
sample, but more false positive classifications (lower specificity) of true patients than 
either the M-FAST or the 6 index MCSTB.
In order to explore incremental validity, coincidence (and independence) of positive 
malingering classifications across the M-FAST and the MCSTB was explored. Table 
10 shows the number of malingerers and true patients who were classified as 
malingering on one, both or neither of the M-FAST and the MCSTB. For those 
participants who malingered on only one instrument, frequencies according to which 
instrument they malingered on, are provided in parentheses.
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Table 10: Numbers of participants in the true patient and simulatine malingerer 






Malingered on 0 29 2 31









Malingered on 2 (both) 
(M-FAST & MCSTB)
2 21 23
Table 10 illustrates that if malingering were deduced only in persons who malingered 
on both instruments, 2 true patients would be misclassified as malingering. Use of 
the MCSTB (for corroboration of classifications on the basis of the M-FAST) in this 
sample then, eliminated 1 false positive classification that would have been made on 
the basis of the M-FAST alone. Use of the two instruments together thus yields a 
(marginally) higher specificity than using the M-FAST alone. However using the two 
instruments in combination and classifying malingering only in those persons who 
malingered on both, yields lower sensitivity in this sample than use of the M-FAST 
alone, since 8 known simulating malingerers who malingered on the M-FAST, did not 
malinger on the MCSTB. Also however, 4 known (simulating) malingerers who did 
not malinger on the M-FAST, did malinger on the MCSTB. If then, the MCSTB were 
used only in persons classified as malingerers on the M-FAST, these 4 known 
malingerers, who tested positive on the MCSTB would evade suspicion and detection.
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RESULTS (PART III)
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUE PATHOLOGY AND 
MALINGERING INDICES
Parametric correlations were performed between scores on each BSI index and indices 
of malingering (M-FAST scores, and composite (and component) MCSTB scores), in 
order to examine whether true symptoms confounded with malingering on these 
instruments. These correlations were performed on the scores of the true patient 
group scores only. The Larzelere and Mulaik Test was applied in order to correct for 
the increased probability of making a Type One error in the event of multiple 
hypothesis testing. Each BSI index was treated as a separate variable and therefore 
the correction procedure was applied on 3 (x8) groups of correlations.
Table 11 summarises the size (and significance) of correlations between true 
pathology and malingering indices in the true patient group. All component scores of 
the MCSTB are stanine (not raw) scores.
The M-FAST scores for true patients were significantly (positively) correlated with 
the Global Symptom Index (GSI) and Positive Symptom Index (PSI) scores of the 
BSI.
Composite MCSTB scores of the true patients did not correlate significantly with 
any index of true symptomatology on the BSI. BSI index scores were also not 
significantly correlated with any component scores comprising the MCSTB.
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Table 11: Correlations between (BSI) indices of true pathology and scores on












Treisman Omission r = - 0.38 r = - 0.345 r = -0.357
Errors
Treisman Commission r = -0.329 r = -0.154 r = - 0.347
Errors
Iconic Memory False r = 0.103 r = - 0.037 r = 0.175
Positives
Iconic Memory Items r = -0.124 r = - 0.060 r = - 0.201
Correct
CDQ Total Score r = 0.399 r = 0.300 r = 0.377
Rey Combination Score r = 0.107 r = - 0.076 r = 0.092
MCSTB Composite r = - 0.076 r = - 0.112 r = - 0.141
Stanine Score
M-FAST Score r = 0.635 r = 0.349 r = 0.623
** **
* p = < 0.05, ** p = < 0.01
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUE ABILITY AND 
MALINGERING INDICES
Correlations were performed between measures of true ability and educational 
attainment, and indices of malingering for the true patient group. The Larzelere and 
Mulaik Test was applied in order to correct for the increased probability of making a 
Type One error in the event of multiple hypothesis testing. The true ability and 
educational attainment variables were treated individually and therefore the correction 
procedure was applied on 4 (x8) groups of correlations. This data is presented in 
Table 12. All component scores of the MCSTB are stanine (not raw) scores.
Table 12: Correlations between indices of true ability and educational attainment and 
scores on malingering indices for the true patient group
Score Index WTAR Camden Reaction Time Educational Level
Raw Scores Pictorial Task
Memory Test
Treisman Omission r = -0.150 r = - 0.225 r = 0.025 r = 0.077
Errors
Treisman Commission r = -0.115 r = -0.201 r = 0.114 r = - 0.179
Errors
Iconic Memory False r = -0.021 r = 0.317 r = -0.04 r = 0.340
Positives
Iconic Memory Items r = 0.023 r = -0.554 r = 0.266 r = 0.011
Correct **
CDQ Total Score r = - 0.109 r = -0.201 r =0.093 r = - 0.219
Rey Combination r = -0.326 r = -0.506 r = 0.093 r = 0.019
Score *
107
MCSTB Composite r = - 0.231 r = -0.490 r = 0.235 r = 0.053
Stanine Score *
M-FAST Score r = -0.109 r = - 0.206 r = 0.307 r = 0.187
* p = < 0.05, ** p = < 0.01
Table 12 shows that scores on the CPMT were significantly negatively correlated with 
Rey combination, iconic items recalled and MCSTB composite stanine scores in the 
true patient group.
Correlations were also performed between the M-FAST scores and composite 
MCSTB scores for the true patient and simulating malingering groups. These were 
found to be not significant in the true patient group (r = 0.226, p = 0.19), or in the 
malingering group (r = 0.028, p = 0.873).
Correlation between M-FAST and CDQ (total) stanine scores were performed, and 
these were found to be highly significant in the true patient group (r = 0.599, p < 
0.001), and also in the malingering group (r= 0.367, p= 0.03).
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DISCUSSION
The principal aim of the present study was to test the ability of the Malingered 
Cognitive Symptoms Test Battery (MCSTB) to discriminate between true patients and 
healthy controls instructed to malinger mental illness. Each participant’s true 
pathology was measured using the BSI in order that true symptomatology could be 
quantified and evidenced in the true patient group, and eliminated in the malingering 
group. True patient BSI scores were also used to explore the confound of true mental 
illness with the investigated index of malingering (MCSTB). All participants 
completed standard tests of cognitive ability including the CPMT and the WTAR 
(prior to instructions to malinger for the malingering group), in order that any relevant 
group differences on these dimensions could be discussed in relation to MCSTB 
scores obtained.
The MCSTB comprises computerised tasks based on Sperling’s (1960) iconic 
memory paradigm, and Treisman and Souther’s (1985) pop-out paradigm. An 
interview of malingered cognitive symptoms developed prior to this study (CDQ) was 
also included in the MCSTB. The M-FAST and RMT (with recognition component) 
were administered in order that classification accuracy for this sample using the 
MCSTB could be compared with classifications according to these established 
malingering assessment tools. M-FAST scores also provided external validation that 
the malingering group did indeed malinger (according to instructions). Furthermore, 
obtaining M-FAST scores potentiated the examination of the utility of the MCSTB in 
providing corroborative evidence of malingering, for classifications made on the basis 
of this ‘gold standard’ screening tool.
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Group differences in demographics, true ability and true pathology for the three 
groups are discussed, followed by a discussion of results obtained on the tests 
comprising the MCSTB. Accuracy of malingering classification, based on the M- 
FAST, RMT and composite MCSTB scores will be discussed at the close of this 
section.
Demographics, true ability and true pathology
WTAR raw scores were lower for patients compared with non-patients. This is likely 
to be attributable to the lower educational status also observed in the true-patient 
group. WTAR scores in the sample were not adjusted for educational status as this 
index was intended to be a rudimentary measure of predicted IQ. WTAR raw scores 
did not correlate significantly with any measure of malingering in this study. 
Reaction time scores were slower in the true patient group, which could be 
attributable to psychiatric symptomatology, including motor retardation, which was 
evident in some patients during testing. Although memory scores on the CPMT were 
lower in the true patient than the healthy control group, they were not indicative of 
significant memory impairment. Analyses of the performance of white and non-white 
patients on tests of true ability and pathology did not evidence any significant group 
differences.
Components of the MCSTB Scores
Iconic memory task scores
Scores for correctly recalled items on the iconic memory task did not discriminate 
between true patients and simulating malingerers. Patients and healthy controls 
performed more poorly than expected on this task, indicating that the task of recalling 
correct items for the exposure times used was more difficult that had been anticipated.
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Also, true pathology in the true patient group was not found to correlate significantly 
with items recalled on the iconic memory task, supporting the suggestion that this task 
was experienced as more difficult than expected by all participants (including 
malingerers) regardless of true pathology. Malingerers recalled significantly less 
items than healthy controls, which is indicative of some suppression of correct 
responses, however this is of little application in malingering assessment, since 
resultant lowered scores did not distinguish malingerers from true patients. A number 
of participants in the malingering group also commented that the speed with which 
they were required to produce answers on the iconic memory task made it difficult for 
them to suppress correct responses. These observations are useful in understanding 
why total items recalled scores on the iconic memory task failed to discriminate 
between true patients and malingerers, and should be considered in further research 
into this paradigm.
Participants across all groups systematically evidenced incredulity at the short 
duration of the stimuli on the screen in the iconic memory task, and also appeared 
surprised when they were able to remember any letters that had been displayed. This 
was particularly relevant in the true patient and healthy control group where 
participants were presumably not attempting to distort responses, and hence provides 
evidence of the face validity of this paradigm as a test of malingering.
Based on the present findings, rather than using the iconic memory paradigm to create 
the illusion of increasing task difficulty (i.e. as exposure duration decreases), and 
thereby face validity as a test of malingering, it would be recommended to conduct the 
true iconic memory task using exposure (50 - 250 msecs) times for optimal correct 
responding provided by Sperling (1960). In this way, true iconic memory scores for
111
true patients and simulating malingerers could be compared, providing more useful 
information about both malingerers’ estimation of task difficulty, and the possible 
confound between symptoms of mental illness and this type of rapid cognitive 
processing (i.e. sensory memory). Correctly recalled item (stanine) scores for the true 
patient group were significantly negatively correlated with scores on the CPMT, 
indicating that higher scores on one memory task were related to lower ones on the 
other. This is a paradoxical finding, particularly since the iconic memory task 
presented here is not likely to measure sensory memory as the duration periods are too 
long, and is more likely in fact to be a measure of short-term memory in common with 
the CPMT.
The total false positive error score on the iconic memory task discriminated between 
true patients and malingerers with a high degree of accuracy. Malingerers produced 
significantly greater numbers of false positive errors, which had a very low base rate 
among true patients. Similar findings using paradigms that potentiate false positive 
responding, have been noted in malingering participants in previous research (The b 
Test: Boone et al., 2002). Healthy control rates of false positive errors on the iconic 
memory task were comparable with those of true patients. Generation of letters that 
are not present is emblematic of sophistication and cognitive flexibility (i.e. 
malingering), rather than cognitive slowing or inattention that might be associated 
with true mental illness. False positive errors on the icon task are indicative then, not 
of suppression of correct responses but of intentional invention. This represents a 
potentially important ‘opportunity’ in the ‘diagnosis’ of malingering, since the DSM- 
IV (APA, 1994) stipulates that evidence of intentionality in feigning symptoms is 
required in distinguishing malingering from differential diagnoses such as factitious 
and conversion disorders.
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The ubiquity of the false positive responding pattern among malingerers may be 
attributable to misconceived ideas about mental illness, such as that delusions and 
hallucinations might cause patients to, not fail to see something, but to see something 
in a distorted way, or even see something that is not there. False positive (stanine) 
scores on the iconic memory task were not found to correlate significantly with true 
pathology (BSI indices) in true patients, which further augments their utility in the 
assessment of malingered mental illness, since regardless of how unwell a true patient 
is, they do not on the whole generate these false positive errors.
Pop-out task scores
Total commission and total omission error scores on the pop-out (and non-popout) 
tasks powerfully discriminated between true patients and malingerers. Simulating 
malingerers made significantly more of each error type on both tasks than true 
patients. Omission errors were made at a higher rate than commission errors for all 
three participant groups. This might be explained by the fact that commission errors 
are potentiated when a pattern of identical (complete or incomplete) circles is 
presented. In this context, a commission error constitutes ‘seeing’ a target (i.e. 
different) stimuli that is not in fact present. When a pattern of circles is presented 
with the target present (i.e. one is different) only an omission (i.e. not seeing it) error 
is possible. In this way a commission error occurs less easily than an omission error, 
since it requires seeing something that is not there, rather than missing a target that is 
present among distractors. Results obtained then, suggest that commission errors are 
indicative of a higher likelihood of intentional distortion (and suppression of correct 
responses), than are omission errors, since they are committed at an almost negligible 
rate by both true patients and healthy controls. As with the false positive errors on the 
iconic memory task, perhaps the ubiquity of the high commission error rate
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‘performed’ by malingerers is illustrative of a misconception that people with mental 
illness see things that are not present, more than they miss things that are present. 
Comparing the responses on these tasks of individuals simulating mental illness and 
those simulating TBI might contribute to our understanding of malingerers’ 
misconceptions about the cognitive sequelae of severe mental illness.
Both omission and commission errors were performed at a higher rate by true patients 
than healthy controls, which might indicate a deficit in this type of preattentive 
processing in patients with mental illness. However, true pathology was found to 
have a significant negative correlation with omission and commission stanine scores, 
which would indicate that higher levels of pathology are related to less omission and 
commission errors. One explanation for this finding might be that patients with 
cognitive and motor slowing, perform tasks in a more laboured way, and hence scan 
displays more thoroughly. Participants across all groups frequently showed an 
awareness of having committed an error (of either type) immediately after committing 
it. If participants had not been asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as 
possible, error rates for all groups would possibly be lower. None the less, low base 
rates among true patients for both error types support the utility of this paradigm in 
the detection of malingering. These findings also support those of previous research 
evidencing distinct types of errors and higher error rates in malingerers on cognitive 
tasks (The b Test: Boone et al., 2002).
Whilst commission error scores are a significantly more powerful discriminator 
between true patients and simulating malingerers, the forced-choice format of the 
pop-out tasks used here, and the random rotation of correct response-types (i.e.
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present or absent target) augment the face validity of these tests for use in the 
assessment of malingering.
In this study it was intended that response latencies be recorded on these pop-out 
tasks. It was hypothesised that malingerers’ response latencies would be larger than 
those of true patients. It was also hypothesised that malingerers might intentionally 
adjust their response times linearly according to the number of distractor items present 
in a display, in contrast to healthy controls’ (and possibly true patients’) anticipated 
patterns of performance on these tasks. Whilst a computer error precluded the 
possibility of obtaining this data in the present study, the pop-out paradigm shows 
promise for use in further research into malingered response latency scores.
Cognitive Dysfunctions Questionnaire (CDQ)
Scores on the CDQ significantly discriminated between true patients and simulating 
malingerers. This indicates that simulating malingerers endorse (malingered) 
cognitive symptoms, as well as the (malingered) psychiatric symptoms assessed by 
the ‘gold standard’ screening tools of malingered mental illness (the SIRS and the M- 
FAST). CDQ (total) stanine scores were highly correlated with M-FAST scores in the 
simulating malingering group. This suggests that simulating malingerers might 
arbitrarily endorse symptoms (and associated levels of distress and frequency, in the 
case of the CDQ) whether are cognitive or psychiatric in nature. This finding is 
interesting and is worthy of further investigation, since current assessment of 
malingered mental illness focuses predominantly on the endorsement of psychiatric 
symptoms. Use of a cognitive symptom focused self-reported symptoms measure 
might augment the validity of malingering classifications on the basis of psychiatric 
symptom based instruments alone.
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CDQ scores were not significantly correlated with true pathology in the true patient 
group. This indicates that patients with higher levels of true symptomatology, do not 
obtain significantly higher scores on the CDQ than patients who are ‘more well’. This 
absence of confound of true mental illness with malingering on the CDQ gives it an 
advantage over the M-FAST, as the latter was significantly correlated with true 
patient pathology in this sample.
Despite these positive results, true patients do achieve significantly higher scores on 
the CDQ than healthy controls. The reasons for this warrants some thought since 
many of the items of the CDQ relate to non-existent phenomena. It may be that the 
format of the CDQ (i.e. oral presentation of symptoms that are endorsed or refuted) 
combined with true patient pathology, is instrumental in leading true patients to 
acquiesce and endorse (non-existent) symptoms. The opening statement of the CDQ 
may increase suggestibility in all participant groups, since it indicates that mental 
illness might be associated with unusual and possibly distressing experiences. It 
would be interesting then, to see what (possibly differential) effect on true and 
malingered responding the inclusion/exclusion of this statement might have. If for 
instance true patients are more suggestible than malingerers, the removal of this 
‘suggestion’ might be advocated. Also in consideration of the future development of 
this promising instrument, data might be analysed to provide scoring systems that 
would maximise discrimination between responses of true patients and those of 
malingerers. For example, more powerfully discriminating items that are consistently 
endorsed by malingerers but extremely rarely by true patients, could be weighted so 
that higher scores would be obtained in the event of their endorsement. An example 
of such an item in the CDQ was “Not being able to remember the first name of one of 
your parents”. Score on this item suggest that its endorsement is highly indicative of
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frank malingering, since 11 simulating malingerers, but only 1 true patient endorsed 
it. An item whose endorsement might warrant a higher score might be for example, 
“Getting confused between up and down”, which was endorsed in this sample by 7 
malingerers and 2 true patients”. Inclusion of items “strongly” and “less strongly” 
indicative of malingering lends face validity to the CDQ, since items must be subtly 
“fake” in order that malingerers believe that true patients might endorse them. Whilst 
it is interesting that true patients endorse symptoms that are non-existent or that they 
appear not to evidence, the veracity of their endorsement is irrelevant in this context 
since, in the development of malingering sensitive tools, the clinician requires 
knowledge of whether patients endorse items, and not whether they actually 
experience them. Items of the CDQ might also usefully be differentially weighted 
(i.e. scored) according to frequency and associated distress indices, since these were 
found to discriminate between true patients and malingerers independently of the 
numbers of symptoms endorsed.
Scores on established tests of malingering
M-FAST scores
The well-established ability of the M-FAST to discriminate between true patients and 
simulating malingerers was replicated in this study. The size and significance of the 
AUC statistic for the M-FAST scores in this study provides evidence that the 
simulating malingerers did actually malinger in accordance with instructions. The 
finding that the M-FAST scores for the malingering group did not correlate with 
indices of their true pathology further augments this external validation of simulation. 
Interestingly however, the mean scores for the malingering group (9.94) in this study 
were notably lower than the simulator validation norms (16.0) in the M-FAST 
manual, and more comparable with the norms derived from known groups validation
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studies (9.69 -  11.5). This suggests that while the M-FAST correctly classified the 
majority of simulating malingerers, these malingerers do not appear to have feigned 
on the M-FAST to as high a degree as simulating participants in the validation studies. 
This may suggest that the malingerers in our sample also malingered less overtly on 
the MCSTB. It would be interesting through replication to investigate the 
relationship between malingering on these distinct tools within individuals. M-FAST 
scores for simulators (and true patients) in this study did not correlate with MCSTB 
scores, yet these instruments each demonstrated significant discriminatory power 
between groups. This may suggest that these instruments measure distinct dimensions 
of malingered mental illness (i.e. cognitive and psychiatric). Indeed if this is the case, 
the use of both instruments in malingering assessment would be advocated, 
particularly in light of the evidence that 12 simulators malingered on one instrument 
(8 on the M-FAST, 4 on the MCSTB) and not the other.
RMT
Neither recall nor formula scores of the RMT discriminated between true patients and 
malingerers in this study. True patients recalled less items than expected, and whilst 
their scores were higher that those of malingerers, this difference was not significant. 
Recognition scores on the RMT were lower across all groups (including healthy 
controls) than recall scores, which is a highly unusual finding, since the advantage of 
recognition over recall memory is well documented (Boone, Salazar, Lu, Wamer- 
Chacon & Razani, 2002). Malingerers committed significantly more false positive 
errors on the recognition part of the RMT, supporting the evidence that when given 
the opportunity to commit false positive (commission) errors on performance tasks, 
persons simulating malingered mental illness will do so. However RMT combination
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scores did not discriminate between true patients and malingerers in this sample, on 
account of the poverty of recall and recognition scores in the true patient group.
Whilst these findings support the literature that individuals with severe mental illness 
do not score below the cut off point on the RMT (recall only), this instrument was 
insensitive to true malingering in this sample, since malingerers did not score below 
this cut off point either. The insensitivity of the RMT (recall only) has been 
documented in previous literature (Back et al, 1996). Results on the recall component 
of the RMT in the present study support evidence of its inadequate sensitivity in 
discrimination between true and feigned complaints (in the context of psychiatric 
illness). However, further investigation into the performance of healthy controls, 
malingerers and true patients on the recognition component of the RMT might be 
recommended since our findings have not supported those cited in the literature 
(Boone, Salazar, Lu, Wamer-Chacon & Razani, 2002).
Composite MCSTB scores
Composite MCSTB scores were derived from the mean stanine scores of 6 indices. 
These were: (1) iconic memory total correct recall; (2) iconic memory false positive 
error; (3) pop-out commission error; (4) pop-out omission error; (5) CDQ total score 
and (6) Rey formula score. Composite MCSTB scores based on performance on these 
6 indices, discriminated significantly between true patients and simulating 
malingerers. These 6 indices were all included in order to derive the MCSTB 
composite score since it was hypothesised at the commencement of this study that 
they would all discriminate between true patients and malingerers. However, 
exclusion of the two indices (iconic memory total recall and Rey formula score) that 
were shown not to discriminate between the two groups (as discussed above) resulted
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in increased sensitivity of malingering classifications (correct identification of 
malingerers), but also decreased specificity (i.e. false positive identification of true 
patients). It may be recommended that this study be replicated using the curtailed 
MCSTB in order to achieve robust results regarding its utility, for respondents’ 
behaviour and performance might differ, rendering the above post-hoc analysis 
inapplicable to true use of the shortened battery.
The heterogeneity of malingering styles has been well documented in the literature, 
and can be accounted for not only with reference to Roger’s Adaptational Model 
(Rogers, 1990a) and the idiosyncrasy of each malingering context, but also in 
consideration of the variation in beliefs, knowledge and preparation available to each 
potential malingerer. In this study, like in the majority of malingering studies, the 
standard deviations for scores into the malingering group were much larger than those 
in the true patient and healthy control groups. This may be due to simulating 
malingerers responding in a pseudorandom way that they believe to be characteristic 
of persons with mental illness. This study has reinforced the potential for cognitive 
tests to be used in this endeavour, and also reinforced the power of the false positive 
error (commission) as a discriminator between true patients and their malingered 
counterparts. Further research might benefit from capitalising on the false positive 
error’s unique association with likely intentionality of response distortion. In order to 
add objective credence to subjective (and inevitably inferential) judgements about 
malingering, and the requisite consciousness of external motivation to deceive, the 
intentionality of false positive responding might best be explored through cognitive, 
objective modalities, as has been the case in this study. This argument is particularly 
strengthened by the evidence in this study that measures of cognitive malingering
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have not confounded with true (quantified) symptomatology, in the way that measures 
of endorsed malingered psychiatric symptoms have.
Composite Score Methodology
In the present sample, the M-FAST did not classify all ‘known’ malingerers, and 
some of these false negative cases were classified by the MCSTB. This evidences 
that not only are malingered responses heterogeneous within instruments as discussed 
above, but also across instruments. Derivation of a composite stanine score from 
performance on several tests offers a way of potentially reducing the inevitable 
problems with classification in the (quite usual) event of individuals malingering on 
one established instruments but not on another. Whilst the M-FAST manual for 
example, stresses the necessity of using corroborative evidence to support (or negate), 
any positive malingering classification, understanding how to go about combining 
scores and classifications across distinct malingering tests is far from understood. Yet 
combination instruments and indices of malingering, (including collateral evidence 
and behavioural inconsistencies) are dictated by classification models (Rogers, 1997). 
It would seem however that the derivation of composite scores from the 
standardisation of scores on several individual tests of malingering, might be useful in 
this endeavour, since individuals do not have to produce malingering indicative scores 
on every component of a battery to be classified. Composite scores of this kind might 
potentially also provide a methodology that minimises false positive classification of 
patients, since scores in the malingering range on one test component might 
potentially be ‘diluted’ in terms of the mean composite score, by cognitive based 
malingering tests (e.g. potentiating false positive responding) on which patient 
response patterns are known to qualitatively differ from those of malingerers.
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Conclusion
This study has demonstrated the utility of the MCSTB in the detection of malingered 
mental illness in a “fully controlled” (Schretlen, 1988) simulation design. The 
differential utility of each of its multi-method (self-report and performance-based) 
components has also been evidenced. Principally then, this study reinforces previous 
evidence that malingerers of mental illness produce associated malingered cognitive 
profiles if  presented with cognitive paradigms (e.g. Clark, 1988). Furthermore, 
despite the superior sensitivity and specificity of the M-FAST in classifying 
malingerers in this study, a number of ‘known’ malingerers who were not classified 
by the M-FAST, were classified by the MCSTB. This suggests that despite the 
predominance of the milieu of reported psychiatric symptomatology in the assessment 
of malingered mental illness, some malingerers malinger on cognitive tests potentially 
more detectably than in the psychiatric interviews. This evidences the importance of 
developing robust methods of assessment for malingered cognitive symptoms in 
severe mental illness.
It would be interesting to examine the external validity of the results obtained in this 
simulation paradigm using ‘at risk’ groups, and certainly this would be a prerequisite 
of application of these results to the clinical assessment of suspected malingerers. 
Further exploratory research examining the utility of the shortened MCSTB would 
also be recommended, and the simulation paradigm is uniquely placed in its 
amenability to such applied malingering research. Comparing the responses of 
participants simulating mental illness and those simulating TBI would be 
recommended for example, in order to provide information about whether the 
MCSTB is useful across malingering contexts. Also, this would provide information 
about differential strategies used by malingerers in cognitive test performance
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PART III: CRITICAL REVIEW
On account of the discussion concluding the Empirical Paper section of this thesis 
being fairly extensive, this critical review will predominantly comprise qualitative 
information about the process of completing this study. It will include observations 
made during interviews, and ideas about how this information (which was not 
recorded and analysed quantitatively), might be used in thinking about future 
research. I will end this section with a short summary of research directions that 
might usefully pursue the findings of this study.
This study entailed the recruitment and interviewing of 35 psychiatric inpatients from 
a single site, and a further 70 healthy controls, 35 of whom were randomly assigned to 
a simulating malingering group. I will commence by discussing observations and 
issues pertaining to patient sampling, recruitment and participation. Malingered 
participation will then be critiqued in the same way. Participation of the healthy 
control group will not be specifically discussed, since this was comparatively 
straightforward, and did not prompt consideration relevant to the development of 
malingering research.
PATIENTS
Particular emphasis was required in the ethical application to the relevant NHS Trust 
for the recruitment of patients that, although this study was about malingering, I was 
not seeking to assess and identify malingerers among the true patient sample. Due to 
potential issues among the patient group about ability to consent (on account of being 
acutely psychiatrically unwell), I included in the ethical application that consent to 
approach individual patients would be gained initially from Responsible Medical 
Officers (RMOs: i.e. consultant psychiatrists). In this stipulation, difficulties with the 
turnover rate of patients on the ward were not anticipated, and it was very difficult in
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practice to contact RMOs to find out whether specific (new) patients might be suitable 
to be approached to take part in this study. In fact, RMOs generally consented to me 
approaching any patients under their care, (whom Ward Managers deemed 
appropriate to take part), and did not have time to be consulted about patients on an 
individual basis. Whilst ethical approval for this study was obtained without 
difficulty, stipulations about how patients would be recruited (i.e. principally through 
RMOs) were difficult to uphold in practice. It would have been more practicable to 
gain overall consent from RMOs and then consult with Ward Managers on the 
suitability of individual patients.
In recruiting the patient sample, I found that patients on the wards whom consultant 
psychiatrists had consented could be approached, were either keen to participate, or 
clear that they did not want to. With a number of patients who wanted to take part, 
they were clear that they did not want to sign anything, including the requisite consent 
form. These patients were not able to take part. Many patients had participated in 
previous research and appeared to understand that research participation was not 
related in any way to their treatment on the ward. Some patients appeared to be 
particularly keen to take part on account that they would be able to work on a 
computer, whilst others were clear that they would not take part precisely for this 
reason. The latter appeared to decline sometimes because they thought they that they 
might not be able to operate a computer as they had never used one before, and 
sometimes because they felt concerned and what appeared to be paranoid (in the 
context of their mental illness) about computers, information broadcast etc.
I observed a significant qualitative variation in psychiatric symptomatology in the 
patients that took part. Whilst this was quantified by administration of the Brief
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Symptom Inventory, it may have been useful to have a system to qualitatively 
document patients’ symptoms. Some patients evidenced positive psychotic symptoms 
during testing, while others appeared to have motor retardation, either on account of 
possible medication side effects or their particular illness process. Some patients’ 
ability to concentrate and stay on task during assessment (particularly during 
computer tasks) appeared to be in contrast with the negative or positive symptoms that 
they were observed to display when unengaged on the ward. For example, a number 
of patients who appeared very inactive when observed prior to participation, 
participated with task demands with tenacity, and appeared able to concentrate 
beyond what might have been expected. Other patients appeared to be stimulated by 
task demands (e.g. stimuli on the screen) and questions in a different way, resulting in 
tangential interpretations and conversations leading to distraction from task demands. 
For example in the pop-out task some patients talked in an interpretive way about 
what they understood the circles to ‘mean’, and appeared to respond in accordance 
with this “meaning system”, rather than in pursuit of the rules of the task. Similarly in 
the iconic memory task, displays of letters flashing for a short duration appeared to 
stimulate some patients into tangential conversation about what they had seen and 
what it “meant”. This, on numerous occasions lead patients to miss the next letter 
display, and prompted verbal input on my part to stay on task. Input to reduce 
distractibility and to encourage attention to, and persistence with, task-focused 
demands was not quantified and can only be described qualitatively. However, this 
may have influenced patient performance on tasks, and affected standardisation of 
instructions.
The above comments on participation process, I believe are useful in informing 
choices about task-format and instructions that might be useful in future research into
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tools for the detection of malingering. However, what is crucially important, in terms 
of interpretation of the results obtained in this study, is that despite patients being 
evidently acutely unwell and behaving accordingly, they performed significantly 
better than simulating malingerers on the majority of administered tasks, and also 
reported significantly less malingered cognitive and psychiatric symptoms.
Non-cognitive symptoms interfered with some patients’ ability to complete the tasks 
yet, since these had not been noted in the exclusion criteria and were related to 
psychopathology, patients who evidenced these symptoms were included in the study, 
and were encouraged to continue participation where possible. Most notably a 
number of patients had extremely shaky hands, and pressing appropriate buttons was 
difficult, which appeared to delay response latencies and influence error rates on some 
tasks.
On the whole, whilst a fairly lengthy test battery was administered in this study, 
taking patients about an hour to complete, most appeared to enjoy taking part, and 
were keen to get feedback on how they had performed. This fact eased the sense of 
imposition sometimes felt in approaching acutely unwell people to help with research.
SIMULATING MALINGERERS
Opportunity sampling was used to recruit simulating malingering participants. On the 
whole people approached were keen to take part. Following the assessment of true 
pathology and ability, and the administration of instructions to malinger, participants 
generally appeared to enjoy “getting into role”, and producing performances that they 
associated with severe mental illness. Instructions generally required further 
explication beyond the instruction sheet given, as many participants appeared to
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attempt to malinger behaviourally, for example by not answering questions or 
answering questions irrelevantly (i.e. not according to response options), or 
attempting to leave the room.
The above observation raises interesting questions about the external validity of 
simulating studies, since simulators are normally required to answer questions and to 
be compliant with the research process, whereas clinical malingerers may seek to 
interrupt the interview or assessment process. Certainly, a number of simulating 
malingerers attempted to be obstructive in answering questions. Non-compliance 
with assessment is one of the DSM ‘diagnostic’ criteria for malingering. However, a 
number of researchers have disputed this criterion (Rogers, 1997) suggesting 
contrarily that malingerers are compliant and keen to engage in assessment, and in 
this way to ‘advertise’ their feigned symptoms in order that they are noted by 
clinicians. It would appear that there is a qualitative distinction between inviting and 
engaging in the assessment process (i.e. being compliant), and in not complying with 
individual task demands apparently on account of being too unwell and therefore 
distractible, not understanding the questions etc. These observations are particularly 
interesting since some true patients needed encouragement to stay on task and to 
comply with task demands, and were distractible in this way, affecting their 
performance on these tasks. Yet this possibly ‘valid’ behaviour was not ‘allowed’ in 
malingerers. This inevitably raises issues in applied malingering research, about the 
comparison of true patient and malingered performances, since criteria for compliance 
might differ in this way according to group membership. In this study, malingerers 
and true patients alike were encouraged to answer questions and to perform on tasks 
within the required parameters in order to assure the validity of results obtained.
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However, these methodological observations might nevertheless usefully be the 
subject of further investigation.
As with the patient group, people in the simulating group appeared to enjoy taking 
part, and many expressed an interest in how realistic their performance had been. 
Many simulators, after they had completed the test battery, commented that they were 
unsure of how to portray their role, with some saying that they adopted particular 
strategies rather than responding randomly. Amongst the strategies volunteered were 
“not getting too many wrong”, “not going for the obvious ones”, “not looking at the 
screen properly” and “doing it backwards” (iconic memory). Simulators also offered 
information about their perceptions regarding what effect mental illness might have 
on their abilities to perform the tasks. For example, some malingerers fed-back that 
they thought that their ability to recognise stimuli in the pop-out tasks and to recall 
letters flashed for short periods might be enhanced in patients with mental illness, 
which appeared to be analogous with notions of the ‘idiot savant’. Other simulators 
thought that there was “no way’ that a person with mental illness could perform these 
tasks successfully, while others still thought that their faculties with regard to doing 
these tasks would not be affected in any way by mental illness.
Malingering participants spontaneously debriefed more in relation to performance 
tasks, than to items on the M-FAST or CDQ, which were in fact rarely mentioned. 
This may have been due to a recency effect, since the cognitive performance items 
were the last to be administered. It may also have been because they felt less 
confident in their knowledge of how mental illness might influence their abilities to 
perform on these tests. Indeed this latter explanation might be supported by the fact 
that CDQ and M-FAST items appeared to be responded to in a way that conveyed
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surety, though interestingly malingerers were regularly observed to laugh at the 
mention of certain items, as though at their preposterousness, and then go on to 
endorse them. Further research on understanding why simulating malingerers respond 
in the ways in which they do on tests, is undoubtedly very useful in informing the 
development of malingering tests.
Feedback from malingering participants should be incorporated into the development 
of malingering tests, since understanding how malingerers interpret and experience 
the testing process allows us to predict how they might behave. In this way we might 
capitalise on common misconceptions about genuine mental illness, in designing tools 
that will maximally discriminate between their performances and those of their true 
counterparts. Also since the possibility of obtaining feedback is unique to the 
simulation paradigm (i.e. ‘known-groups’ do not admit to malingering), it ought to be 
taken advantage of. The additional component of a short feedback form for 
simulating malingerers in malingering research does not unduly lengthen the size of a 
test battery and provides invaluable information. Themes contained in feedback from 
previous studies might be used to design structured feedback tools, facilitating 
quantitative analysis of malingering styles and perceptions.
FUTURE RESEARCH
This study demonstrated that simulating malingerers of mental illness malingered 
cognitive tasks when invited to do so, and also that they had perceptions about how 
the process of severe mental illness might affect patient’s abilities to perform the 
cognitive tasks presented. Since the field of developing tools for the cognitive 
assessment of malingered mental illness is fairly new, feedback from simulating
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malingerers in such studies is of significant importance in this research, as it tells us 
how malingerers interpret task demands in relation to the profile that they are trying to 
malinger. In future simulation studies in malingered cognitive symptoms in mental 
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1 July 2004, I am pleased to inform you that the above research has been granted ethics 
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separately and if there are significant changes to the research protocol you should seek 
confirmation of continued ethical approval by completing the ‘Amendment Approval 
Request Form’.
The form identified above can be accessed by logging on to the ethics website homepage: 
http://zzz.grad.ucl.ac.uk/ethics/ and clicking on the button marked ‘Key Responsibilities of the 
Researcher Following Approval’.
2. It is your responsibility to report to the Committee any unanticipated problems or adverse 
events involving risks to participants or others. Both non-serious and serious adverse 
events must be reported.
Reporting Non-Serious Adverse Events.
For non-serious adverse events you will need to inform , Ethics 
Committee Administrator ). within ten days of an adverse incident 
occurring and provide a full written report that should include any amendments to the 
participant information sheet and study protocol. The Chair or Vice-Chair of the Ethics 
Committee will confirm that the incident is non-serious and report to the Committee at the 
next meeting. The final view of the Committee will be communicated to you.
Letter to  Dr W atts 07/07/2004 APPENDIX 1 CONTINUED
Reporting Serious Adverse Events
The Ethics Committee should be notified of all serious adverse events via the Ethics 
Committee Administrator immediately the incident occurs. Where the adverse incident is 
unexpected and serious, the Chair or Vice-Chair will decide whether the study should be 
terminated pending the opinion of an independent expert. The adverse event will be 
considered at the next Committee meeting and a decision will be made on the need to 
change the information leaflet and/or study protocol.
3. On completion of the research you MUST submit a brief report (maximum of two sides of 
A4) of your findings to the Committee. Please comment in particular on any ethical 
issues you might wish to draw to the attention of the Committee. We are particularly 
interested in comments that may help to inform the ethics of future similar research.
Yours sincerely




(Version 2 -  Dated 22.09.2004)
You are being asked to participate in a research project. The statement below 
explains in ordinary language what will happen to you if you agree to take part; it 
describes any risks or discomfort you may experience, and it also explains what we 
hope to learn as a result of your taking part. You should not take part if you do not 
wish to do so. Declining to take part will not affect you in any way.
LREC Registration Number -04/Q0410/9
Brief Title o f Project
Assessment of Cognitive Symptoms in Mental Illness 
Explanation
This sheet is designed to help you to decide whether you would like to take part in a 
research project. Please feel free to ask questions before you make your decision 
about taking part - the researcher will be happy to explain anything that you are not 
sure about. You may withdraw your agreement to take part at any time.
What is the research about?
The research is designed to help us to understand more about the range of difficulties 
that people can report experiencing and their performance on short psychological 
tests.
What is involved?
If you take part you will be asked a number of questions about a number of symptoms 
which you may or may not experience. You will also be asked to complete some short 
psychological tests. We would like you to be as honest as possible when answering 
the questions and to perform to the best of your abilities on the tests. In total, this 
should take approximately 60 minutes. We have no reason to believe that you will 
experience any adverse effects from taking part in this study. You should decline to 
take part in this study if:
•  You have a history of severe mental illness (e.g. schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder)
• You have a history of neurological disorders (e.g. Parkinson’s, epilepsy)
• You have ever had a head injury resulting in being unconscious for more than 
10 minutes
• You have a serious reading difficulty
You will not be asked to give a reason for declining to take part. We hope that this 
research will enable us to improve the efficiency with which we diagnose the 
presence of mental illness in people who report symptoms of mental illness.
This research is anonymous and confidential. If you are an employee of the 
Trust you should know that we will make NO record of your participation in 
your employment records.
APPENDIX 2 CONTINUED
Remember that taking part in research is completely voluntary and that you can
choose to withdraw your consent at any time
This study will be reviewed and approved by the Ealing Local Research Ethics 
Committee and the UCL Committee for the Ethics of Non-NHS Human Research.
APPENDIX 3
Participant Identification Number for this trial:
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: Assessment of Cognitive Symptoms in Mental Illness
Name of Researcher: Jelena McMennemin
PLEASE SIGN BELOW AFTER READING THOROUGHLY
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason.
3. I agree to take part in the above study.
Name of Participant Date Signature
Researcher Date Signature
APPENDIX 4
INFORMATION SHEET FOR HEALTHY CONTROLS 
(version 1 -  Dated 22.9.2004)
You are being asked to participate in a research project. The statement below 
explains in ordinary language what will happen to you if you agree to take part; it 
describes any risks or discomfort you may experience, and it also explains what we 
hope to learn as a result of your taking part. You should not take part if you do not 
wish to do so. Declining to take part will not affect you in any way.
Brief Title o f Project LRE C Registration Number - 04/Q0410/9
Assessment of Cognitive Symptoms in Mental Illness
Explanation
This sheet is designed to help you to decide whether you would like to take part in a 
research project. Please feel free to ask questions before you make your decision 
about taking part - the researcher will be happy to explain anything that you are not 
sure about. You may withdraw your agreement to take part at any time.
What is the research about?
The research is designed to help us to understand more about the range of difficulties 
that people can report experiencing and their performance on short psychological 
tests.
What is involved?
If you take part you will be asked a number of questions about a number of symptoms 
which you may or may not experience. You will also be asked to complete some short 
psychological tests. We would like you to be as honest as possible when answering 
the questions and to perform to the best of your abilities on the tests. In total, this 
should take approximately 60 minutes. About 15 minutes into these tasks you will be 
instructed to answer the questions in a particular way. You will not be told the details 
of this yet, as it is important that you answer questions at the beginning without being 
aware of the instructions that you will be given later.
We have no reason to believe that you will experience any adverse effects from taking 
part in this study. You should decline to take part in this study if:
• You have a history of severe mental illness (e.g. schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder)
• You have a history of neurological disorders (e.g. Parkinson’s, epilepsy)
• You have ever had a head injury resulting in being unconscious for more than 
10 minutes
• You have a serious reading difficulty
APPENDIX 4 CONTINUED
You will not be asked to give a reason for declining to take part. We hope that this 
research will enable us to improve the efficiency with which we diagnose the 
presence of mental illness in people who report symptoms of mental illness.
This research is anonymous and confidential. Remember that taking part in 
research is completely voluntary and that you can choose to withdraw your
consent at any time
This study will be reviewed and approved by the Ealing Local Research Ethics 
Committee and the UCL Committee for the Ethics of Non-NHS Human Research.
APPENDIX 5 Ealing Local Research Ethics
Committee 
30 June 2004
Ms Jelena McMennemin 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Sub Dept, of Clinical and Health 
Psychology
University College London 
Dear Ms McMennemin,
Full title of study: Malingered Cognitive Deficits in Severe Mental Illness 
REC reference number: 04/Q0410/9 
Protocol number: 4
The Research Ethics Committee reviewed the above application at the meeting held on 14 
June 2004.
Ethical opinion
On the information sheet for malingering healthy controls, there is some information witheld 
at the point of consent, this could perhaps be explained a little fuller. It is not stated 
anywhere that the participant can withdraw at any time.
The members of the Committee, present gave a favourable ethical opinion to the above 
research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting 
documentation.
The favourable opinion applies to the following research site:
Site: West London Mental Health NHS Trust
Principal Investigator: Ms Jelena McMennemin
Conditions of approval
The favourable opinion is given provided that you comply with the conditions set out in the 
attached document. You are advised to study the conditions carefully.
Approved documents
The documents reviewed and approved at the meeting were:




An advisory committee to  North West London Strategic Health Authority
Management approval APPENDIX 5 CONTINUED
The study may not commence until final management approval has been confirmed by the 
organisation hosting the research.
All researchers and research collaborators who will be participating in the research must 
obtain management approval from the relevant host organisation before commencing any 
research procedures. Where a substantive contract is not held with the host organisation, it 
may be necessary for an honorary contract to be issued before approval for the research can 
be given.
Membership of the Committee
The members of the Ethics Committee who were present at the meeting are listed on the 
attached sheet.
Notification of other bodies
We shall notify the research sponsor, West London Mental Health NHS Trust and the 
Medicines and Health-Care Products Regulatory Agency that the study has a favourable 
ethical opinion.
Statement of compliance (from 1 May 2004)
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating 
Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK.
REC reference number:  Please quote this number on all correspondence
Yours sincerely,
Chairman
Enclosures List of names and professions of members who were present at the meeting
and those who submitted written comments
Standard approval conditions [SL-AC1 or SL-AC2]
An advisory committee to  North West London Strategic Health Authority
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W E S T  L O N D O N  M E N T A L  H E A L T H
25 October 2004
Dear Ms McMennemin
Re: Malingered cognitive deficits in severe mental illness
I am pleased to confirm that the above project has received Trust R&D approval, and you may now 
commence your research.
May I take the opportunity to remind you that during the course of your research you will be expected to 
ensure the following:
■ Patient contact: only trained or supervised researchers who hold a Trust/NHS contract 
(honorary or full) are allowed contact with Trust patients. If you do not hold a contract please 
contact the R&D Office as soon as possible.
- ■ Informed consent: original signed consent forms must be kept on file. A copy of the consent
form must also be placed in the patient’s notes. Research projects are subject to random audit
by a member of the R&D Office who will ask to see all original signed consent forms.
■ Data protection: measures must be taken to ensure that patient data is kept confidential in
accordance with the Data Protection Act.
■ Health & safety: all local health & safety regulations where the research is being conducted 
must be adhered to.
■ Adverse events: adverse events or suspected misconduct should be reported to the R&D Office 
and the Ethics Committee.
■ Project update: you will be sent a project update form at regular intervals. Please complete the 
form and return it to the R&D Office.
■ Publications: it is essential that you inform the R&D Office about any publications which result 
from your research.
We would like to wish you every success with your project.
Research Governance Co-ordinator
WEST LONDON MENTAL HEALTH NHS TRUST & CENTRAL & NORTH WEST LONDON MENTAL HEALTH NHS TRUST
Regards
APPENDIX 6
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PATIENTS 
(version 2 -  dated 22.9.2004)
You are being asked to participate in a research project. The statement below 
explains in ordinary language what will happen to you if you agree to take part; it 
describes any risks or discomfort you may experience, and it also explains what we 
hope to learn as a result of your taking part. You should not take part if  you do not 
wish to do so. If you decide not to take part and you are a patient, your treatment will 
not be affected by your decision. You are free to withdraw if you are a patient 
without affecting your subsequent treatment.
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS SHEET
LREC Registration Number: 04/Q0410/9
Brief Title o f Project Assessment of Cognitive Symptoms in Mental Illness.
Explanation
This sheet is designed to help you to decide whether you would like to take part in a 
research project. Please feel free to ask questions before you make your decision 
about taking part - the researcher will be happy to explain anything that you are not 
sure about. You may withdraw your agreement to take part at any time.
What is the research about?
The research is designed to help us to understand more about the range of difficulties 
that people can report experiencing and their performance on short psychological 
tests.
What is involved?
If you take part you will be asked a number of questions about a number of symptoms. 
You will also be asked to complete some short psychological tests. We would like you 
to be as honest as possible when answering the questions and to perform to the 
best of your abilities on the tests. In total, this should take approximately 60 minutes. 
We have no reason to believe that you will experience any adverse effects from taking 
part in this study.
This research does NOT involve any physical examinations or the giving of any 
medication. Taking part -  or not taking part -  in the research will not affect the care 
you receive in any way. Your participation will not be recorded in your notes.
Remember that taking part in research is completely voluntary and that you can 
choose to withdraw your consent at any time.
This study will be reviewed and approved by the Ealing Local Research Ethics 
Committee and UCL Committee for the Ethics of Non-NHS Human Research.
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Participant Identification Number for this trial:
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: Assessment of Cognitive Symptoms in Mental Illness
Name of Researcher: Jelena McMennemin
PLEASE SIGN BELOW AFTER READING THOROUGHLY
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 22.09.2004 
(Version 1) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being 
affected.
I understand that sections of any of my medical notes may be looked at by responsible 
individuals from West London Mental Health NHS Trust or from regulatory 
authorities where it is relevant to my taking part in research. I give permission for 
these individuals to have access to my records.
I agree to take part in the above study.
I understand that if I reveal anything to the researcher that indicates a risk o f harm to 
myself or others or an intention to leave the hospital without permission the 
researcher will inform nursing staff about this.
Name of Participant Date Signature
Researcher Date Signature





Mental disorders are associated with a wide range of difficulties and unusual 
experiences. Some of these experiences can be very distressing. This questionnaire is 
designed to help us to understand the difficulties and unusual experiences that some 
people report having and how distressing they find them. I will be asking you about 
70 different types of problems. Please say yes if  you have had any of these problems 
within the last three months, otherwise say no. You may not be sure if  you have had 
any of these things. If you are not sure that you have had these things just say that you 
are not sure.
Gustatory
1) Your sense of taste being much stronger than usual
2) Feeling flooded by tastes
3) Not being able to taste one thing because of being flooded by different tastes
4) Often getting a vinegar-like taste in your mouth for no obvious reason
5) Not being able to taste things on one side of your tongue.
Olfactory
6) Your sense o f smell being much more powerful than usual
7) Feeling flooded by smells
8) Not being able to smell one thing because o f being flooded by different smells
9) Often being able to smell something like burning rubber for no reason
10) Getting the taste or smell of something just by touching it (for example touching 
an apple and tasting it in your mouth before you eat it).
Tactile/somatic
11) Reaching for something but your hand missing it by more than a couple of inches
12) A muscle or muscles jumping or twitching
13) Loss of the ability to write down words on paper
14) Your handwriting having changed a great deal
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15) The impression that you have lost the ability to control your left hand at times and 
it seeming to have a “mind of it’s own”.
16) Finding it very difficult to judge how heavy things are when you pick them up 
with your hand
17) Finding it very hard to tell if things are hot or cold when you are touching them.
18) Finding it very hard to tell if things are rough or smooth when you are touching 
them.
19) Finding it very hard to tell how big things are when you are touching them
20) Finding it very hard to tell what shape things are when you are touching them.
21) Loss of the ability to feel sensations down one side of your body.
22) The feeling that a part of your body has got much larger.
23) Loss of the ability to feel things on your face
24) Having great trouble keeping your balance when walking
25) Your hands trembling when you start writing
26) Not being able to control your arms or hands like you used to.
27) Not being able to do things like tying up shoelaces or doing up buttons any more
28) Things that you are holding seeming much bigger or smaller than they usually do.
29) The feeling that a part of your body has got much smaller
30) Not being able to do simple things like drawing simple shapes 
Auditory / verbal
31) Sounds being louder or more intense
32) Feeling flooded by sound
33) Not being able to concentrate on one particular sound because of feeling flooded 
by other sounds
34) Not being able to say words that you used to be able to say
35) Everyday sounds sounding somehow different to before
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36) Repeating things that other people say even though you do not mean to do so
37) Repeating yourself a lot
38) Buzzing followed by ringing in the ears
39) Hearing the things that people say to you repeated over and over in your head.
40) Not being able to repeat something that somebody has said.
41) Starting to say something and then forgetting what you meant to say
42) Thinking that people talking in your language are talking in a different language
43) Not being able to remember the names of things
44) Jumbling your words when you speak 
Visual things
45) Your vision being much more powerful than usual
46) Feeling flooded by visual images
47) Not being able to concentrate on one visual image because o f feeling flooded by 
lots of visual images
48) Things just not seeming to have any colour when you look at them.
49) Not being able to recognise things properly when you are looking at them.
50) Double vision
51) Things seeming to change colour when you look at them for more than a couple 
of seconds
52) Not being able to tell the difference between colours like you could before.
53) Things that you look at having a greenish colour to them
54) Not being able to recognise the faces of people that you know.
55) Things looking much smaller than they used to.
56) Things seeming to look much closer than they did before
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57) Things looking much bigger than they used to.
58) Visual things being repeated. For example, a person will walk past you, and then a 
few minutes later you will get the impression of seeing them walk past you again.
59) Things that you look at having a reddish colour to them 
Confusion / cognitive
60) Not being sure if you are right or left handed
61) Not understanding how to do even simple maths like adding up or taking away 
any more
62) Not being able to remember what you had for breakfast
63) Not being able to remember the first name of one of your parents
64) Not being able to remember your date of birth
65) Not being able to remember what happened yesterday
66) Not being able to remember anything for a reasonably long period of your life (for 
example not remembering anything from secondary school)
67) Getting confused between up and down
68) Getting confused between left and right
79) Loss of the ability to tell the time when you look at a clock
APPENDIX 9
ICONIC MEMORY TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
(Version 1 -dated 27.09.2004)
Now I am going to ask you to do something on the computer again.
This is a test of the speed and accuracy of mental processing. During this task many 
displays of 8 letters will appear on the screen like this (show sample on computer). 
During each display the letters will be different but they will always be presented in 2 
rows of 4.
The letters will be flashed on the screen for a very short time period so it is important 
that you keep paying attention to and looking at the screen at all times.
After each set of letters flashes up I will say either “top” or “bottom”.
If I say “top” it is your task to tell me in the right order what the letters in the top row 
of the grid were.
If I say “bottom” it is your task to tell me in the right order what the letters in the 
bottom row of the grid were.
Shall we take a look at a couple of examples?
Here is the first example (show letters -  and say 1 when they disappear from the 
screen). Wait for respondent’s answer. If correct say “yes that’s right when I say “ 1” 
you report the letters on the top row. If the participant does not appear to understand, 
repeat above instructions and further demonstrations of reporting the top row.
Now let’s run through some examples o f reporting the bottom row, which you need to 
do after I say “2” following a display of letters. Are you ready to try this out? (Show 
bottom row demo, say “2” after letters have disappeared and wait for respondent’s 
answer).
Repeat as above with as many demonstration trials as necessary until the respondent 
comprehends these instructions. Note respondent does not need to respond correctly 
to sample trials in order to commence real trials, but he does need to comprehend 
instructions.
Have you got any questions before we begin?
This task is split into 3 sections and the time for which you see the display of letters 
gets MUCH shorter and shorter. In the second section the letters appear for HALF the 
time they first appeared for. In the third section the letters appear for half the time 
they appeared for in the second section -  so the task gets MORE DIFFICULT as you 
go from section to section. Remember to keep your eyes on the letters at all times, so 
as not to miss them, and also to do your best. Remember to report the letters from left 
to right.
APPENDIX 10
POP OUT TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
(Version 1 -dated 27.09.2004)
We are now going to do something else on the computer. This task is designed to test 
the speed and accuracy of your mental processing. Again it is important that you try 
to complete the task as quickly and as accurately as possible. First I will explain what 
I would like you to do.
•  PART 1 (POP)
During this task you will see a number of different patterns of circles come up on the 
screen. In some o f the patterns the circles will all be the same. In others there will be 
one “odd circle out” which has a piece missing from it.
(Indicate Sample 1)
Do you see these circles on the screen?
Can you see that one of them is different from the rest? (Indicate incomplete circle) 
When you see that the circles are not all the same and there is one with a piece 
missing like this, I want you to press this button here (1). I have marked it “D” for 
different to help you to remember.
Now look at his group of circles. (Indicate Sample 2).
Can you see that they are all the same? There is not a circle with a piece missing out 
if  it like there was last time. When you see a pattern like this, where all circles are the 
same, I would like you to press this button here (+/_). I have marked it “S” for same, 
to help you to remember.
Do you understand what you need to do?
So, press D when you see one different circle in the group, and S when they are all the 
same. Do not worry if you make a mistake just move onto the next answer.
Do you have any questions?
Remember your job is to press the buttons as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
You can keep your fingers over the buttons throughout the task to help you answer 
more quickly if  you wish to.
The task is ended when no more circles appear on the screen.
Are you ready to begin?
• PART 2 (NONCIRC)
Thank for doing those.
Now I am going to ask to you to do a very similar task on the computer, except that 
this time the rules are a bit different.
Again there are patterns of circles that come up on the screen, and I want you to press 
“D” for different if there is an odd one out, or “S” for same if all the circles are the 
same.
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I will show you how this task is different from the last.
In this example, can you see that the odd one out is the full circle and that the other 
circles each have a piece missing. For this display you would press “D” for different 
because they are not all the same.
Then, in this example, you can see that the circles are all the same, and they all have a 
piece missing. For this one you would need to press the “S” button, because they are 
all the same.
Do you understand what you need to do?
Do you have any questions?
Remember that you should answer as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Are you ready to begin?
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR COMPLETING THESE TASKS.
